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This Essay examines the dramatic increase in business networks in
recent decades and considers whether the law can play a useful role in
supporting the efficient functioning of these inter-firm relationships for
coordination and cooperation. Repeat play, reputational sanctions, and
norms of trust and reciprocity are the common explanations for the
flourishing of networks in many industries and places. But the evidence
also shows that a certain class of networks often fail to survive or function
effectively and beneficial cooperation among these network members is
impaired. These fragile networks develop organically without a controlling
party or hierarchy at the center of the network to facilitate network
formation. Lacking a controlling entity, they are “webs without any
spider.” Clusters of industrial districts are traditional examples of this
class of networks. More recently, the information revolution has stimulated
a dramatic increase in another type of “spiderless” network: networks of
strategic alliances are now a common means of organizing collaborations
among firms in high technology and R & D intensive settings. In both types
of spiderless networks there are no legal mechanisms to control moral
hazard and free riding risks during the period of network formation and
operation. We show how in theory the law could support spiderless
networks by allowing firms who externalize benefits to other firms in the
network to recover for those benefits. Practical considerations may limit
the implementation of a full-blown right of restitution. Nevertheless, by
recognizing a limited right to recover for uncompensated costs and benefits
in appropriate cases, the law can function as a background norm for
sharing costs and benefits among network members, motivating them to
overcome daunting coordination problems. We consider several
implementation issues, show how they might be resolved, and apply our
analysis to a set of well-known spiderless networks.
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INTRODUCTION
When business parties want to collaborate they have traditionally
pursued either market transactions or integration. Starting in the 20th
century, but continuing at a much greater pace in the past two decades as a
product of the “information revolution,” business networks have emerged
as a third avenue of cooperation. Inter-firm networks are mechanisms for
coordination and cooperation between formally independent but
functionally interdependent firms. They provide firms with access to
essential capabilities and resources that are under the control of other firms
in their environment. Firms in networks frequently contract with others in
the network to further their network project and these contracts can create
benefits for, or impose costs on, other network members who are not
contract parties. Addressing the moral hazard, free riding and distributional
issues raised by these externalities in the absence of formal legal ties
among (all) participants has challenged economists, sociologists and
organizational theorists. In lieu of legal mechanisms, repeat play,
reputational sanctions, and norms of trust and reciprocity are the common
explanations for the flourishing of networks in many industries and places.
Until recently, the question of why some networks are durable and
others are fragile has been largely ignored by legal scholars.1 This lack of
attention to how networks emerge and stabilize owes, in part, to the fact
that legal intervention in networks is relatively rare. In addition, the overly
broad focus on a network as a generic mode of cooperation and
collaboration is too capacious to permit useful legal analysis. Some
networks, for example, can deploy standard contractual mechanisms—
whether in the form of a master contract as in the case of a franchise, or a
bureaucratic contractual structure as in the case of trade associations—that
support network collaboration. These relationships have a “spider in the
web” —a controlling party or hierarchy at the center of the network that
facilitates network formation and maintains stability.2 Other networks,

1

Some significant exceptions are Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third Party
Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (2015), and Lisa
Bernstein, Private Ordering, Social Capital, and Network Governance in Procurement
Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration (mimeo 2015).
2 We are grateful to Ron Gilson for suggesting the metaphor of the web with and without a
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however, are fundamentally symmetric or parity-based. Lacking a
controlling entity, they are webs without any spider. In the case of these
"spiderless networks," there are fewer legal mechanisms to control moral
hazard and free riding risks during the period of network formation and
operation.3 As a consequence, the evidence shows that many spiderless
networks are fragile and fail to survive despite the evident benefits to
network members from inter-firm cooperation.
In this Essay, we focus attention on two key types of spiderless
networks that form organically in order to exploit the positive returns from
coordination and cooperation but lack any centralized control. Clusters of
industrial districts, such as Silicon Valley, are traditional examples of one
class of spiderless networks. This network type consists of geographically
compact agglomerations of small and medium sized firms in an industry
characterized by volatile or rapidly shifting demand, all of which specialize
in a particular phase of production or a production process.
In addition, the information revolution, and the consequent rise in
uncertainty, has stimulated a dramatic increase in another once novel
spiderless network. Aggregations of strategic alliances, of which the
biotech network is the most familiar, are now a common mechanism for
organizing collaborations among firms in high technology and R & D
intensive settings.4 Some of these alliance networks lack the social
networking features—personnel mobility and geographical and cultural
proximity—that support a number of industrial districts. While there are
bilateral (collaborative) contracts between individual firms in these alliance
networks, the network itself as a mode of coordination and cooperation is
not formalized into a contract or bureaucratic structure. Here the
membership in the network is “vague and fluid;”5 the actions of any party
can create positive externalities for others but the same behavior also
motivates moral hazard and free riding by others in the network. These
risks undermine what we call a “reciprocity equilibrium.” A reciprocity

spider.
3 There is not a sharp distinction between spider and spiderless networks; the distinction we
draw is primarily instrumental to the goals of this essay: we use the designation of a
spiderless network to describe any environment where network members create positive
externalities for themselves and others in the network through repeated interactions and
where there are no contractual or organizational ties linking network members together.
4 Ranjay Gulati & Martin Gargiulo, Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From?,
104 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1439, 1441, 1445 (1999) (stating that "[T]he number of
interorganizational [strategic] alliances has grown at an unprecedented rate in the last 15
years" and that most organizations are embedded in a variety of interorganizational
networks, such as board interlocks, trade associations, and research and development
ventures); Walter W. Powell & Paul Brantley, Competitive Cooperation in Biotechnology:
Learning through Networks?, in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE FORM AND
ACTION 366 (N. Mohria & R. Eccles eds. 1992) ("In the past decade we have seen a
pronounced shift away from a strict reliance on internal R&D to a greater emphasis on
various forms of externally based collaborative research and development").
5 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1.
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equilibrium results when each network member receives from the network
a benefit proportionate to the benefits it creates for others and the costs it
incurs.6 If network participants deviate significantly from a reciprocity
equilibrium the network will fail to form successfully and, even if formed,
further efficient participation and operation of the network may be
precluded. If, however, moral hazard and free riding problems can be
mitigated, the network produces value by generating information flows that
advance innovation and reduce the costs of the search for new alliance
partners.
The starting point of our analysis is the formation of clusters and
alliance networks with particular focus on those industries where social
capital7 is weak and data show that externalities threaten network
performance and emerging networks frequently fail.8 We ask: can the law
usefully support the formation and efficient operation of these networks
that lack a spider in the web? And, if so, under what conditions would legal
remedies effectively complement existing relational modes of motivating
reciprocity among network members?
To begin to answer these questions, we develop an informal model
that shows how the law of restitution and unjust enrichment can in theory
encourage efficient network formation and operation by allowing key
participants to receive some of the benefits currently captured by other
participants. Under the model, any member of a network who creates net
benefits for others, and whose costs are greater than private benefits, is
entitled to recover the lower of two measures—either the verifiable benefits
created for others or the difference between the benefactor’s costs and
benefits.9 The model also supports a distributional principle where the
members are entitled to share the network surplus according to their costs,
the benefits they received and the benefits they conferred. While our model
suggests that restitution remedies can be most useful in supporting
networks where social capital is weak, it also has the potential of enhancing
the efficiency of even those networks that currently appear to function
adequately without any legal support.
After presenting the model, we explain how it could be implemented
by a straightforward extension of familiar common law doctrines. We also
discuss some possible hurdles, including the costs of evaluation and
enforcement as well as the risk that a legal remedy may crowd out rather

6

See infra Section I.B.2.
Social capital refers to the creation of relation-specific trust between firms that is created
through interpersonal ties among key employees, the emergence of norms of reciprocity and
experience in problem solving though information exchange. See e.g., Sinead Roden &
Benn Lawson, Developing Social Capital in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: The Contingent
Effect of Relation-Specific Adaptations, 151 IND. J. PRODUCTION ECON. 89, 90-91 (2014)
(discussing the social capital theory).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
9 See infra Section II.C.
7
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than braid with the relational forces that otherwise support network
formation. This analysis argues against high-powered legal enforcement,
such as the disgorgement of all gains, and in favor of low-powered
remedies such as the recovery of a portion of the realized benefits from
network participation. Even in the face of high evaluation and enforcement
costs, however, a narrowly structured right of restitution can still function
as a background rule—a focal point for sharing the benefits and costs
among network members, motivating these parties to overcome the
coordination problems that otherwise deter them from creating a spider to
organize the distribution of network value.10
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we present a typology of
business networks sufficiently rich to capture the breadth of cooperative
inter-firm relationships but also sufficiently parsimonious to serve as the
basis for understanding the relationship among the factors that determine
how and whether the network will emerge and how it will function. We
show how access to social capital distinguishes those spiderless networks
that appear quite stable (despite the absence of legal enforcement) from
others where high uncertainty and the absence of social capital makes them
more vulnerable to uncontrolled moral hazard problems.11 We focus on
four exemplars of how network benefits are disproportionately distributed
among network members and isolate the conditions under which the
introduction of legal remedies to support these fragile relationships might
serve as complements to existing relational norms.
In Part II we develop an informal model under restrictive assumptions
to show how restitution remedies have the potential to aid in solving the
moral hazard and free-riding problems characteristic of spiderless
networks. The model suggests clear criteria for implementing a remedial
scheme and illustrates how its application can support network formation
and operation. Part III then applies the model to the paradigmatic network
contexts where moral hazard and free riding problems threaten network
survival. Here we show how a limited right of restitution can overcome
10

See infra Section III.E. Our premise is that there is a positive, though imperfect,
correlation between network value and social welfare. Because the correlation between
network welfare and social welfare is imperfect, however, our normative views are
tentatively held. An additional justification for adopting network welfare as a criterion is
that normative critique, when directed at courts, should take into account the type of goal a
court can implement. Courts are not equipped to make global welfare assessments, but
should be able to discern whether permitting or denying a legal claim would better advance
network goals.
11 See infra Section I.A.2. Social capital ties that form in networks characterized by
geographical concentration and personnel relationships are stronger in some networks, such
as industrial district clusters and biotech alliances, than they are in emerging alliances
among widely separated firms with different cultural patterns and little movement of
personnel among the network members. The key characteristic of the dramatic growth of
strategic alliance in the last several decades has been the increasing diversity of alliance
partners’ nationalities. Ranjay Gulati, Alliances and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 293,
302 (1998).
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common objections to using legal remedies to internalize network
externalities. Even in a world of high evaluation and enforcement costs, a
narrowly crafted right of restitution can still function as an efficient
background norm—a bargain-enabling default12—that motivates members
of spiderless networks to adopt a governance regime to regulate the
cooperative relationship among the network firms.
We conclude that extending a carefully limited right of restitution to
members of spiderless networks can encourage them to reach contractual
solutions to the asymmetric distribution of network benefits. Networks are
dynamic forms of organization and the evolutionary process implies a
movement toward the development of a centralized regime (a spider) to
control distribution of network value.13 The challenge is how best to
stimulate the evolutionary process before externality problems cause the
network to fail. A limited right to claim recovery for externalized benefits,
even if only available in special cases, can function as a “virtual spider”
and thereby reduce the incidence of failure in those networks that form
spontaneously.

I. BUSINESS NETWORKS AND THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM
A. Factors that Distinguish Networks and their Governance
The starting point of a typology of business networks is the claim that
two characteristics of the particular environment—the presence or absence
of a controlling regime or agent (the spider) and the uncertainty associated
with the market determine the range of governance mechanisms networks
require in order to overcome moral hazard and free riding problems.
1. Networks with Spiders
When networks form around (or are formed by) a central agent—a
regime that exercises some control over the distribution of benefits and
costs in the network—the level of uncertainty determines how the parties
The concept of a “bargain-forcing default” was first developed in Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1488-90 (2004). In this context, “bargain-enabling” more
accurately describes the coordinating function that a background restitution rule provides for
spiderless networks. We choose the term “bargain-enabling” rather than the alternative of
“penalty” defaults because the latter has the narrower meaning of inducing disclosure when
disclosure would permit more efficient contracting performances. But see Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989) (discussing penalty default rules).
13 The centralizing regime may be a bureaucratic mechanism to internalize benefits (as in
the case of cooperatives and trade associations) or a controlling agent (as in the case of the
purchasing firm in supply chains) with responsibility for devising mechanisms such as
association rules or master contracts that specify network obligations.
12
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respond to the challenges of maintaining the network. As we illustrate in
Figure 1, when uncertainty is low, networks with controlling agents deploy
more conventional forms of contingent contracting to control conflicts
among members. Examples include franchises,14 construction contracting,15
contemporary credit card networks,16 standard setting organizations,17 and
networks formed by hospitals with service providers, insurance companies
and patients.18 In each case, there is an agent whose economic interests are
advanced by the creation of the network and who has incentives to control
network size and to internalize network externalities. Sometimes the
optimal network size is not sufficiently clear ex ante for the spider to write
a master contract. But even then, third party beneficiary law permits parties
to signal the intent to cover third parties even though they have not been
identified explicitly in the ex ante contracting process.19 Another network
form in this environment is the trade association where control is
formalized in associational contractual agreements. Here the formal
agreement specifies the organizational relationships between allied parties
but the degree of formalization never substitutes for the presence of a social
capital network.20

14

Claims by network members arise frequently in franchise networks. The disputes vary,
sometimes involving claims by franchisees (either existing or potential) arising out of
contractual obligations assumed by the franchisor in the master franchisee contract. See,
e.g., Chu v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 171, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (claim by a
prospective franchisee suing on the basis of a settlement agreement between the franchisor
and former franchisees).
15 Disputes over defective or failed performance in large construction projects frequently
arise in these networks where the litigation centers on disputes between the owner of the
project and various sub-contractors whose primary contractual relationship is with the
general contractor. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fireguard Corp., 249 Va. 209 (1995);
A.E.I Music Network, Inc., v. Business Computers, Inc., 290 F. 3d 952 (2002); Guardsman
Elevator Co., Inc., v. United States, 50 Fed.Cl. 577 (2001).
16 See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 164 (describing
credit card networks).
17 Standard-Setting Organizations (SSOs) form networks with members who rely on
industry standards to “establish technical specifications to ensure that products from
different manufacturers are compatible with each other.” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing SSOs).
18 Networks form between hospitals, hospital service providers, patients, insurers and
HMOs. Third party beneficiary suits are common in this category of networks. For cases
where patients sued as third party beneﬁciaries of contracts between hospitals and service
providers, see, e.g., Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Dorr v. Sacred
Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 1.
19 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. Schwartz & Scott offer an improvement on the current
third party beneficiary default of no third party liability. By taking into account network
theory and the state’s interest in preserving network functioning, they call for a more precise
understanding of when a spider would have the necessary intent to grant contract rights to
other network members.
20 Anna Grandori & Giuseppe Soda, Inter-firm Networks: Antecedents, Mechanisms and
Forms, 16 ORG. STUD. 183, 201 (1995).
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Figure 1: Network Governance and Uncertainty
Low Uncertainty
Spider

Trade associations,

High Uncertainty
Collaborative supply chains

franchises, construction Ks,
credit cards, SSOs
No spider

Industrial district clusters

Strategic alliances

Even in high uncertainty environments, spiders are capable of
developing governance structures that rely on contract. Here the prime
example is the evolution of the modern supply chain that relies on
collaborative contracting between the suppliers and the buyer to coordinate
vertical or transactional interdependencies between and among the firms.21
The higher level of uncertainty does not preclude contract but does change
the nature of contracting. Facing conditions of high uncertainty, modern
supply chains have devised radically incomplete bilateral collaborative
agreements together with master contracts that commit the parties to
collaborate but do not structure the course or outcome of the
collaboration.22 Collaborative contracts braid with the evolving social
network that nurtures norms of coordination and cooperation. Even though
the contract is radically incomplete, the formal legal mechanisms facilitate
the parties’ search for reliable partners and the productive use of
information generated through the network. As a consequence of the
braiding of formal and informal enforcement, trust develops endogenously
both within the bilateral collaborations as well as among the members of
the network.23
In sum, incentive problems in the spider cases are mitigated by a
combination of bilateral contracts, third party beneficiary law, multilateral
master contracting and bureaucratic control. Moreover, all things equal, the
presence of a spider means that internalization is also easier to effect

21

Bernstein, supra note 1, (manuscript at 14-27); Claude Menard, The Economics of Hybrid
Organizations, 160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 345, 348 (2004); J. TIENEKENS & P
ZUURBIER, CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN AGRIBUSINESS AND THE FOOD INDUSTRY (2000); JOSH
WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING (2005).
22 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Dis-Integration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 459-63
(2009) (discussing the John Deere supply chain).
23 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1377 (2010); Bernstein, supra note 1, (manuscript at 28).
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through self-enforcement: since the network size tends to be fixed, and
network purpose controlled by the spider, traditional mechanisms for
informal or purely relational contracting are more readily accessible. To be
sure, moral hazard and in particular free riding problems are common in
these multilateral relationships. The formation of these networks often
provides positive benefits to third parties that free ride on the efforts of
others in the network24 and even if they pay for the benefits they receive,
their payments do not cover the fixed costs sunk in the formation of the
network. Nevertheless, despite these inefficiencies the networks with a
spider present fewer problems for legal regulation than the webs that form
without any spider.
2. Spiderless Networks
Networks that lack a central agent emerge and form organically and,
as in the case of networks with spiders, the structure of network governance
is determined by the level of uncertainty. As Figure 1 illustrates, lower
levels of uncertainty characteristic of the “traditional” economy have
produced a spiderless prototype – clusters of industrial districts. Although
clusters remain viable today, the dramatic increase in spiderless networks
has come from the growth of strategic alliance networks: this is a network
form adapted to higher levels of uncertainty, where commercial practices
are disrupted by unforeseeable changes in technical possibilities and market
conditions. We briefly describe each network form and then turn to the
challenge of devising a governance structure for spiderless networks.
a. Clusters of industrial districts. Clusters of industrial districts are
geographically compact agglomerations of small and medium sized firms
in an industry characterized by volatile or rapidly shifting demand, all of
which specialize in a particular phase of production or a production
process. Finished goods are produced by groups of firms collaborating in
rapidly shifting constellations.25 By recombining and thereby augmenting
fragmented, specialized, and mostly tacit knowledge, a multiplicity of
cooperative firms in a cluster adapts rapidly to changes in the economic
environment. Agglomerations of this kind played an important role in the

24

See, e.g., infra Section II.C.
Up to some limit, the more firms in a cluster, the easier it is for each firm to find the
partners it needs, the lower its costs of production. Up to the size limit, therefore, firms in a
cluster constitute positive externalities for each other. The attraction of these positive
externalities is (part of) what draws firms to the cluster in the first place, causing
agglomeration. See Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL.
ECON. 483 (1991) (discussing why and when manufacturing becomes concentrated in a
specific region); EDGAR M. HOOVER & RAYMOND VERNON, ANATOMY OF A METROPOLIS:
THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF PEOPLE AND JOBS WITHIN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN
REGION 49-55 (1959) (arguing that small firms operate in the more crowded portions of the
region in order to share some facilities, such as capital or labor, with others).
25
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industrialization of parts of Europe and the United States from the late 18th
century onwards.26 Variants are common in more recent industrializers
ranging from Japan to Taiwan to Brazil to Kenya, and in the development
of Silicon Valley.27 Since the turbulence in the markets for mass produced
goods in the mid-1980s made valuable the ease with which clustered firms
could recombine as conditions changed, clusters are a microcosm of the
“new” economy, able to prosper in much more volatile conditions than the
vertically integrated large corporation.
b. Strategic alliance networks. Strategic alliances are bilateral
collaborations between firms that are motivated to resolve uncertainty over
the challenges of rapid technological development where research
breakthroughs are so broadly distributed that no single firm has all the
capabilities necessary for success. Research to produce further
technological advances thus requires collective collaboration designed to
pool the broadly dispersed information of a large number of firms.28 Over
time, these alliances aggregate to form a cluster—or network—of firms
whose membership shifts over time and who lack any centralized control.
The network grows during periods of rapid change as members are
motivated to reduce the inherent uncertainties associated with novel
products or markets through the sharing of private information that benefits
each firm in its own pursuits.29
Despite the absence of a spider, there is significant information
exchange and co-development in alliance networks, leading to long-term
commitments between alliance partners in the network. The alliances act as
a conduit for the flow of private information about resources and
capabilities. The knowledge that is created by the information exchange
within the individual alliances in the network diffuses throughout the

26

See CHARLES F. SABEL & JONATHAN ZEITLIN, WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES: FLEXIBILITY AND
MASS PRODUCTION IN WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZATION 463, 499-500 (1997) (arguing that
collaboration between firms makes it easier to survive market fluctuations).
27 On Japan, see DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE: INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN JAPAN (1988); on Silicon Valley, see ANNALEE
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND
ROUTE 128 (1994), and Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575 (1999); on Taiwan, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2006); on Brazil and Latin America, see Elisa Giuliani
et al., Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Lessons from Latin American Clusters, 33
WORLD DEVELOP. 549 (2005); and on Italy, see Roberta Rabellotti, Anna Carabelli &
Giovanna Hirsch, Italian Industrial Districts on the Move: Where are they Going?, 17
EUROPEAN AND PLANNING STUD. 19 (2008).
28 Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and
Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 251, 252-53 (2001).
29 Id. at 265-66.
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network. Thus, the network becomes a reservoir of all the informational
value that accumulates within that particular sphere of economic activity.30
At one time, these alliance networks were rare but in the current
economy they have grown dramatically and are now a common mechanism
for organizing cooperative activity, particularly in technology intensive
settings.31 The prototype of these strategic alliances is the biotech network
consisting of a university/research entity (inventor), a number of biotech
companies, large pharmaceutical firms and venture capital firms joined by
their common interest in the development of therapeutic compounds to cure
disease.32
B. Characteristics of Spiderless Networks and the Governance Problem
In this section we examine the key elements in the formation of
spiderless networks with particular focus on the challenge of preserving the
value generated by the network itself.
1. Network Formation and Resulting Value
How do spiderless networks emerge in the absence of the
coordinating capabilities of a central agent? Organizational sociologists
have traditionally looked to exogenous factors such as the distribution of
technological resources that motivate firms to create the ties necessary to
manage uncertainty and satisfy their resource needs.33 But this focus on
exogenous conditions ignores the fundamental question of how a firm
comes to choose its alliance partners. Gulati and Gargiulo present a theory
with supporting data that suggests that the risk of opportunism motivates
30

Balaji R. Koka & John E. Prescott, Designing Alliance Networks: The Influence of
Network Position, Environmental Change and Strategy on Firm Performance, 29
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 639, 640 (2008).
31 See David T. Robinson, & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic
Alliances, 23 J. L. & ECON. ORG. 242, 245 (2006) (over 5500 alliances between dedicated
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical firms and universities have been formed since the mid1970s); M. Hergert & D. Morris, Trends in International Collaborative Agreements, in
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 99 (F.K. Contractor & S. Leinhardt
eds. 1988) (analyzing the increasing use of collaborative agreements between international
partners).
32 These networks have been widely studied by organizational sociologists. E.g., Walter W.
Powell, Kenneth Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Inter-organizational Collaboration and the
Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1996);
Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J.
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 197 (1996); see also Powell & Brantley, supra note 4 and
Powell, supra note 28.
33 See, e.g., Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, supra note 32, at 119 ("A network serves as a
locus of innovation because it provides timely access to knowledge and resources that are
otherwise unavailable…"); Powell, supra note 32, at 205 (noting the necessity of pooling
capabilities and assets as a key factor in inter-organizational collaboration in the
biotechnology industry); RONALD BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION: NETWORKS
OF MARKET CONSTRAINTS AND DIRECTORATE TIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1983).
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firms to select partners with whom they have or can develop trust sufficient
to support the iterative exchange of private information.34 Over time, these
“embedded” relationships develop into a network that has unique value as a
repository of information about the capability and character of prospective
partners. The more that the network internalizes information about
potential partners, the more firms look to the network in searching for new
partners. Through this iterative process, new entrants gain valuable
information and also contribute new knowledge to the network that shapes
the formation of future network collaborations.35
The aggregation of information about prospective partners creates a
value to participation in the network independent of any surplus from the
bilateral agreements formed between individual network dyads. Firms
develop many ties to others who in turn have ties to others and thus become
highly embedded in the network. Embeddedness, in turn, diffuses valuable
information throughout the network.36 In this way, networks foster learning
by encouraging novel syntheses of information that is qualitatively distinct
from the information that resides in the individual dyads.37 This reservoir of
valuable information serves to reduce the cost of searching for new partners
and also enables embedded firms to exploit the knowledge acquired in any
given strategic alliance or cluster by combining it with complementary
knowledge gained from other sources.38 In short, the network serves as a
club good that reduces contracting costs and enhances innovation
opportunities for network members. If the network matures to the point
where the community norms are entirely self-enforcing, the network is a
substitute for the legal enforcement of the radically incomplete contracts
that are formed between alliance and cluster members.39

34

Gulati & Gargiulo, supra note 4, at 1440-42.
Id. at 1440.
36 The network generates value that is shared in two ways. There are “internal” benefits that
each dyad realizes through its participation in the network. In addition, there are “external”
network benefits that are disproportionately distributed throughout the network. For a
discussion regarding the various means that firms use to capture network benefits, see infra
Section I.C.
37 Powell, supra note 4, at 371 (arguing that external linkages are means of gaining fast
access to knowledge and resources that cannot be secured internally "by … bringing
together different operating assumptions and new combinations of information"). For
discussion and examples, see discussion infra Sections I.C.2-4.
38 Firms use their network position to capture network externalities in two ways, either (1)
by developing many ties with others and thus exploiting an information-rich network
position, and/or (2) by bridging a gap in the network (a “structural hole”) that enables the
firm to exploit resource and informational differentials within the network. See Jeffrey Dyer,
Harbir Singh & Prashant Kale, Splitting the Pie: Rent Distribution in Alliances and
Networks, 29 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 137 (2008) (discussing how collaborating firms split
the surplus of their collaboration), and discussion infra Section I.C.
39 Robinson & Stuart, supra note 31, at 244 (arguing that the alliance network functions as a
social institution that aids in contract enforcement, and therefore "plays the same role as the
court").
35
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2. Moral Hazard and Free Riding Risks to Achieving a Reciprocity
Equilibrium
The essential conflict in both cluster and alliance networks is the
incentive for cooperation and coordination side-by-side with the incentive
for competition: parties share the motivation to capture as many benefits as
possible at the lowest possible cost, and at the same time are motivated to
act reciprocally in forming and maintaining the network. Reciprocal actions
among network members satisfy what we have called a “reciprocity
equilibrium”, when every network member receives from the network a
benefit proportionate to the benefits it creates for others and the costs it
incurs.40 But a reciprocity equilibrium is a unique condition. Things
become more complicated when some members capture more or fewer
benefits than what is justified under the reciprocity condition, either
because of their different capabilities in externalizing or internalizing
benefits, or because of moral hazard and free riding problems. Moral
hazard is motivated by members' desire to save costs since the benefits they
produce are shared by others; free riding is motivated by members' desire
to capture benefits produced by other members and avoid the costs of
producing those same benefits. These self-interested actions undermine the
reciprocity equilibrium and thus threaten the durability of spiderless
networks.
Thus, in strategic alliance networks it is often the case that firms with
many ties to others become structurally embedded in the network while
others that are not as well connected remain on the periphery.41 In order to
collaborate with centrally embedded firms, peripheral firms offer specific
resources, especially private information, to their alliance partners. In this
way, some embedded firms are able to extract rents from those firms that
are less connected and, at the same time, these highly embedded firms can
use their prior connections to build new ties and so remain deeply
embedded in the network.42 In short, the rich get richer: a firm that has a
greater number of alliance relationships or that bridges a “structural hole”
in the network frequently can enjoy network benefits that are not available
to a peripheral network member. In this way, the highly embedded firm
receives more and contributes less than the less embedded firm, and the
reciprocity condition is not satisfied.43
To illustrate the consequences of these asymmetries, consider a

40

For further discussion on allocating network surplus among members to achieve a
reciprocity equilibrium, see infra Section II.C.5.
41 Gautam Ahuja, Francisco Polidoro Jr., & Will Mitchell, Structural Homophily or Social
Asymmetry? The Formation of Alliances by Poorly Embedded Firms, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 941, 941 (2009).
42 Id. at 944-45. We discuss the asymmetric distribution of private network benefits infra
Section I.C.
43 Dyer et al, supra note 38, at 143-45. See infra Section I.C.
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scenario where facilitating the network’s formation requires the
participation of a firm whose costs of participation are greater than its
expected benefits, but lower than the expected benefits for all members
once the network forms. For example, assume that an owner of a “magnet”
enterprise is contemplating locating in an industrial district; the magnet
firm’s participation is expected to generate a substantial percentage of the
positive externalities from participating in the network. The other network
parties are small firms that are expected to aggregate around the magnet
firm once the industrial district is stabilized. The magnet enterprise,
however, needs to invest in creating the network: it has to relocate its large
facilities and relocation is costly. The firm also bears the risk that the
network may fail, and then it would bear irrecoverable losses and gain no
corresponding benefits. The network in this example is a club good; once it
is formed, participating firms can use the proximity and tacit knowledge of
others to their benefit and no one can exclude them. Thus, the resulting risk
of free riding may prevent the network’s formation. 44
In other cases, other transaction costs could bar efficient operation of
networks. For example, imagine that a firm at the periphery of an alliance
network calculates that the firm’s costs of revealing private information
exceed the expected benefits from a collaborative agreement with another
network member even though the information, once disseminated, would
create net benefits to other network firms in excess of the peripheral firm's
costs. Ideally, other members would agree to compensate the peripheral
firm and induce it to reveal its private information. But the difficulty of
negotiating a sharing rule in a high uncertainty environment could preclude
any agreement to share the costs of subsidizing the peripheral firm.45
3. Relational Governance of Spiderless Networks
Under current law, enforcement of inter-party understandings in
alliance and cluster networks is purely relational. Spiderless networks use a
reputation for cooperation and trustworthiness as a guide to future
interaction, relying on a combination of reputation, repeated dealings, and
tit for tat reciprocity to distribute network value. 46 In some instances, these
relational norms can produce a durable network environment. Thus, for
example, the evidence suggests that, despite the absence of formal rights
and obligations, the forces that govern cooperation in mature biotech
alliances are quite robust, with trust and cooperation increasing with
44

Unless payments are made to the magnet firm, it will not establish the network. Payments
would not be made, however, because (absent coordination) each of the other firms would
refuse to share in the costs of establishing the network, hoping to free-ride on other
members' investments.
45 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23, at 451-55 (explaining the phenomenon of
incomplete preliminary agreements that adapt ex post to changed circumstances, and that
regulate only an agreement to collaborate rather than the outcome of the collaboration).
46 Powell, supra note 32, at 207-08.
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participation in the network.47
The evidence of successful formation of strategic alliance networks is
quite mixed, however. Biotech networks are supported by a strong form of
social capital ties: social capital is particularly useful in alliances where the
contribution of each alliance member to the network is ambiguous and
difficult to measure.48 But in industries that are not characterized by strong
forms of social capital there is substantial evidence that spiderless networks
are highly delicate and prone to fail. Here, the individual firms face serious
incentive problems and often fail to overcome the transactions costs of
forming a network that survives to maintain cooperative norms.49 In
particular, strategic alliances among disparate firms from a wide range of
national origins (a very common circumstance in the global economy) face
a variety of risks and pitfalls if they cannot cope adequately with the moral
hazard and free riding problems caused by the difficulty in learning about
the competencies and character of potential partners.50 In this setting, a
potential partner may either limit its contribution to the network or, in the
alternative, behave opportunistically by taking advantage of its network
position to exploit resources or information gained from others. Moreover,
as noted above, in the case of clusters the inability of network members to
agree on sharing rules impairs the ability to attract founding members or
new entrants whose costs of entry may exceed their private benefits.
C. Four Exemplars of Externalities in Spiderless Networks
In this section we describe four exemplars of how network benefits are
disproportionately distributed among spiderless network members: in each
case there is an asymmetry of costs and benefits that can threaten network
formation and duration.

47

In durable networks, there is a kind of mutualism or normative integration at the level of
the network community. This community level mutualism is both self-maintaining and selfenforcing. See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated
Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT J. 85 (1995) (analyzing data
concerning industrial alliances, concluding that the existence of trust stemming from prior
interactions affects the chosen contractual form).
48 W.G. Ouchi & M. K. Bolton, The Logic of Joint Research and Development, 30 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 9 (1988).
49 Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 AM. REV. SOCIOL.
57, 71 (1998) (“Journalistic and management sources are essentially unanimous in the
conclusion that an extremely large proportion of at least one common type of network
organization--strategic alliances--result in failure”). To be sure, even absent moral hazard
and other incentive problems we would not expect all strategic alliance networks to succeed.
They are capital investments, which like others sometimes will fail and sometimes will
succeed.
50 The reputation sharing process at the heart of a network deteriorates with distance.
AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
(2004). See also Y. L. Doz, The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances: Initial
Conditions or Learning Processes?, 17 STRAT. MGMT. J. 55 (1996); and Bruce Kogut, A
Study of the Life Cycle of Joint Ventures, 28 MGMT. INT. REV. 39 (1988).
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1. Magnet Firms and Late Arrivals
As we noted above, the industrial district cluster is an example of a
spiderless network that forms organically as a function of the synergies
from agglomeration.51 The industrial cluster is similar to (but not the same
as) the alliance network. It is similar in the sense that the network creates
benefits from agglomeration that are more than simply the sum of all its
participant’s actions. An asymmetry of network costs and benefits can
result, however, as a by-product of the relatively greater importance of
magnet enterprises. While the magnet firm externalizes substantial benefits
on other network members it receives fewer benefits from them. If the
asymmetry is sufficiently large, the magnet would not move to (or act to
create) the industrial district even when it would be socially desirable: if
the private benefits the firm expects to derive from its relocation are less
than private costs, the network won’t form even though the total social
benefits—including the positive externalities conferred upon others —are
greater than the magnet’s private costs.
Assuming that magnet enterprises fortuitously are already located in
the putative industrial district the agglomeration process can proceed
organically but further problems arise as relocation costs—land values,
labor costs, etc.—rise over time such that later arrivals face higher
participation costs than earlier arrivals. In this case, as we indicate in Part
III, the mobility of skilled labor among network firms is an important value
as it increases social capital and indirectly redistributes network benefits.
The most salient American example of a cluster with these properties
that nonetheless may be vulnerable to disruption is the Silicon Valley
network that emerged in the 1990s around several successful computer
technology-related firms and Stanford University in California. These
magnet entities motivated startup enterprises to locate in Silicon Valley.52
In turn, the surge in the number of Silicon Valley startups induced a
number of venture capital firms either to relocate to Menlo Park and its
environs or to expand their Valley offices. This in turn encouraged more
entrepreneurs to locate their startups there. Ultimately venture capitalists,
dot-com startups, and other R&D entities clustered in and around the
geographical area. This clustering produced a parallel effect in the labor
market as engineers, scientists and software designers located in the area in
search of better job opportunities. This skilled labor was highly mobile and
as they moved among firms, social capital increased in the cluster. In turn,

51

To be sure, some industrial districts are formed by state subsidies, and thus are formed
around spiders, but our concern remains those that can form organically.
52 For a time, the Silicon Valley cluster was in competition with the cluster that was forming
around Route 128 in Boston, Massachusetts. The Route 128 cluster withered in large part
because of the lack of mobility of scientific talent that was impeded by the enforceability of
covenants not to compete in Massachusetts. Non-compete agreements are generally
unenforceable in California. Gilson, supra note 27.
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this concentration of technically skilled labor increased the incentive for
new startup enterprises to locate in a region where there was an ample
supply of skilled labor.
But the formation of a cluster network is dynamic and vulnerable to
exogenous shock. In the case of Silicon Valley, for example, the increase in
the cluster of business and labor has fueled a dramatic increase in
residential and commercial real estate costs as well as deterioration in
ancillary services owing to rapid growth.53 This has led a number of firms
to move to alternative locations such as Austin, Texas and RaleighDurham, North Carolina.54 To be sure, these changes don’t necessarily
doom the Silicon Valley cluster. But they do imply that the cluster will not
function as efficiently as it might have if the network had a mechanism to
redistribute costs and benefits more efficiently. In short, to sustain cluster
performance in the longer term, clusters need to manage network openness
to business outside the cluster while facilitating strong inter-organizational
relationships within the cluster.55
2. Freeriding on Indirect Ties
A firm can also benefit differentially from participation in a strategic
alliance network to the extent that it can exploit knowledge gained
indirectly from other network members that are not alliance partners. A
simple example illustrates the point: Imagine that firm A has an alliance
with firm B that, in turn, has an alliance with firm C. In the course of the BC alliance, C obtains private information attributable to A that C can
exploit elsewhere by transferring that knowledge to other business projects
within the firm that are not directly related to the alliance with B. The
resulting private benefits are those that C can earn unilaterally to the extent
that it has the capacity in other projects to realize the benefit. The
successful exploitation of Firm A’s private information is thus a function of
the degree to which Firm C’s scope of resources and activities are related to
the activities of Firm A.
The alliance between Apple and Sony to assemble Apple’s successful
PowerBook line of portable computers provides a useful case study of how
private benefits are exploited through indirect acquisition of knowledge. 56

53

Nitin Dahad, As technology booms, U.S. startups are driven beyond Silicon Valley, THE
SILICON
VALLEY
(Nov.23,
2015),
http://www.thenextsiliconvalley.com/2015/11/23/3885-us-startups-are-driven-beyondsilicon-valley/ (discussing the side effect of rapid growth in technological clusters).
54 Id.
55 A. B. Eisingerich, & L. Boehm, Group Analysis: Why Some Regional Clusters Work
Better Than Others, 3 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. J., 1–3 (2007) (discussing three factors that
are especially powerful in determining a cluster's competitiveness and growth potential).
56 See generally Brenton R. Schlender, Apple's Japanese ally its new notebook computer made by Sony - shows why alliances are hot in the PC business, FORTUNE MAGAZINE
(Nov.
4,
1991),
NEXT
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The Apple-Sony alliance linked Apple’s capability at designing easy to use
computer products with Sony’s miniaturization capabilities. Apple’s
expertise in producing the laptop computer was developed, in turn, through
contractual alliances with other strategic partners, including IBM.57
Although both Apple and Sony benefitted from the success of the
PowerBook, Sony ultimately realized greater private benefits due to
synergies between its consumer electronics business and its growing
computer business.58 Sony used the alliance with Apple, including
knowledge developed by IBM (and later transferred to Apple), to learn how
to design and manufacture laptop computers as well as allied consumer
electronics. While Apple earned private benefits from its alliance with
Sony, none of those benefits accrued to its other strategic partners,
including IBM. In this way, Sony was able to free ride on the network
benefits that IBM had generated in its alliance with Apple. These indirect
and extra-contractual transfers of private information are positive
externalities common to strategic alliance networks, but if benefiting firms
are able to free ride on this knowledge, network value will decline and
network performance and durability will be impaired.
3. Exploiting “Structural Holes”
Firms that are strategically embedded in alliance networks can capture
a disproportionate share of the network’s benefits by exploiting their
position in the network. Specifically, some firms are able to bridge gaps
(known as “structural holes”) in the network by brokering relationships
with other parties who are not directly connected to each other. Firms that
occupy a positional monopoly in networks with many structural holes can
exert control over information flows and thereby extract monopoly rents
from alliance partners. These firms not only share in the common benefits
generated with their alliance partners but also extract private benefits—
access to information or resources—that are a function of their controlling
position in the network.
The ability to exploit a positional monopoly in the network is well

http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1991/11/04/75695/index.htm
(describing the Apple-Sony alliance).
57 See e.g., Important events in the saga of Apple Computer Inc., BOSTON BUSINESS (Jun.8,
1997), http://www.boston.com/globe/business/packages/microsoft_apple/apple_chron.htm
(presenting Apple's business history).
58 A. Inkpen & A Dinur, Knowledge Management Processes and International Joint
Ventures, 9 ORG. SCI. 454, 455 (1998) ("Sony… has formed various alliances with computer
and telecommunications firms in an effort to forge new technology linkages for its
consumer electronics products. The alliances give Sony access to a wealth of new
knowledge"). Before its alliance with Apple, Sony had little experience in the computer
industry. The firm used knowledge from the Apple-IBM alliance to launch its own popular
line of laptop computers. Dyer et al., supra note 38, at 142.
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illustrated by the Tata Group, the largest business group in India.59 Tata
operates in a number of different industries, including steel, automobiles,
hotels and information technology. The Tata Group, as India’s Largest IT
firm, has many alliances with foreign firms wishing to do business in
India.60 There are also many smaller Indian firms with strong capabilities in
IT, especially in software development.61 But these smaller firms, lacking
Tata’s size and long-term presence in the market, are not able to form
alliances directly with foreign entities.62 Tata’s alliances with foreign firms
provides privileged access to information about positive value projects,
product specifications and pricing and new developments in relevant
technologies. To be sure, some portion of Tata’s ability to extract more
favorable terms in its alliance contracts with the smaller Indian firms is a
return on its investment in reputation. Lending that reputation to the Indian
startups justifies a market return. However, the private benefits of control it
enjoys by bridging this gap also permits Tata to extract monopoly rents
from its smaller Indian partners when together they form alliances to
service the needs of large foreign customers. In essence, the monopoly
rents take the form of freeriding on a portion of the network benefits
contributed by the smaller Indian firms.63 One consequence of this
imbalance in the distribution of network benefits may be found in the
evidence that many of these international strategic alliance networks are
fragile and prone to disintegration.64
4. Exploiting Informational Synergies
We noted above that networks generate informational value that is
independent of the value produced in any individual alliance dyad.
Informational synergies develop from the ability of firms to acquire
different sources of private information from many different alliance
partners. Thus, a firm in an alliance network that occupies a central
position with many network partners can use the diverse sources of
information gathered from each alliance to make better-informed
investment decisions going forward. The capabilities developed by a
centrally positioned firm as a result of knowledge gained from the network
59

List of entities associated with Tata Group, WIKIPEDIA (last updated Sep.26, 2015, 9:59
PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_entities_associated_with_Tata_Group.
60 See, e.g.,Tata Strategic Management Group enters into an alliance with Roland Berger
Strategy
Consultants,
TATA
(Feb.11,
2009),
http://www.tata.com/company/releasesinside/sXzPuLZHl!$$$$!E=/TLYVr3YPkMU=
(discussing the alliance between Tata Management Strategic group and Roland Berger
Strategy Consultants, one of the largest strategy consultants in the world).
61 See, e.g., List of Indian IT companies, WIKIPEDIA (last updated Dec.5, 2015, 8:46 PM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_IT_companies (presenting a list of notable
companies in the IT sector based in India).
62 Dyer et al., supra note 38, at 143-44.
63 Id.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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of alliances are private benefits that are only indirectly related to any
particular alliance relationship. These private benefits will not be available
to alliance partners with only a small number of relationships. Assuming
each party in the network expends an equivalent cost in the information
revelation that contributes to the network’s information-rich environment,
some firms are capturing a disproportionate share of the benefits, merely as
a function of their position in the network. This asymmetry of costs and
benefits is yet another way that network externalities can threaten network
durability.
Microsoft is an example of a firm that has a large number of alliance
ties with various technology firms and, as a consequence of its size and
financial resources, occupies a central position in the computing industry
alliance network.65 Its central position in its alliance network gives
Microsoft access to more and better information than its alliance partners.
The resulting synergies position Microsoft to better determine what
positive value projects it should pursue in the future. Dyer, Singh and Kale
report that interviews with Microsoft’s alliance partners reveals
dissatisfaction with the asymmetric distribution of network benefits:
Microsoft is viewed as a fairly undesirable alliance partner in terms of
generating reciprocal benefits in an alliance.66 One explanation for the
negative reaction of other network members to their association with
Microsoft is the realization that Microsoft is able to exploit its central
position in the network to accumulate uncompensated benefits in excess of
its contribution to the network.
5. The Effects of Externalities on Network Performance and Longevity
The preceding exemplars illustrate the differences between clusters
and strategic alliance networks, and those differences affect the
performance and longevity of the two types of networks in different ways.
In clusters, formation and stabilization of the industrial district requires
mechanisms to motivate magnet firms to locate within the cluster and to
ensure that late arrivals that face higher costs can receive compensating
benefits. In this way the common benefits created by the cluster are
redistributed with the goal of allocating the network surplus in proportion
to members' benefits conferred and costs incurred. In alliance networks,
firms form dyads that produce private alliance benefits that are shared
contractually while some (few) firms are able to capture a disproportionate
share of the network’s common value. A given firm’s calculus whether to
65

Y DOZ & G. HAMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE 233 (Harvard Bus. Press 1998) (claiming that
“Microsoft has been able to enroll nearly the entire information technology industry in its
alliance network”). See also David Kirkpatrick, These Days Everybody Needs a Microsoft
Strategy,
FORTUNE
MAGAZINE
(JAN.12,
1998),
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/01/12/236432/index.ht
m (discussing businesses' necessity in forming strategic partnerships with Microsoft).
66 Dyer et al., supra note 38, at 145.
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participate in maintaining the network is thus a function of its costs
(including opportunity costs) and the combination of network and private
or contractual benefits it receives. As a generalization, networks that
generate both high network benefits and high private benefits for the firms
in the network will produce the most durable alliances and thus increase the
efficiency and longevity of the network. Alternatively, networks in which
many firms experience low network benefits and low private benefits
relative to a few embedded firms would be the least stable.67
To the extent that the four exemplars of network externalities
described above illustrate a general phenomenon, the question with which
we began then becomes salient: Can legal remedies that facilitate
internalization be adapted to an environment in which high measurement
and litigation costs are likely to impede firms seeking to redistribute
network value?
***
What should courts do when asked to consider legal claims for
exploitation of network value or free riding on network information? We
answer that question in two stages. In Part II, we develop a model that
shows how a right of restitution can in theory be used to support a
reciprocity equilibrium in spiderless networks by authorizing the recovery
of uncompensated benefits given to others. We turn, then, in Part III to
consider how a narrowly circumscribed right of restitution would apply to
the four exemplars described above and evaluate objections to extending
restitution remedies to these network contexts.

II. RESTITUTION THEORY AND SPIDERLESS NETWORKS
In this Part, we address the question whether legal enforcement can
supplement relational norms and efficiently constrain the self-interested
actions that otherwise undermine the formation and operation of spiderless
networks. Using the reciprocity equilibrium as a baseline, we develop an
informal model that specifies rights of restitution for network members.
The model is based on two central tenets of restitution law. The first tenet
is that a party who voluntarily confers benefits on others can (under
specified conditions) recover the value of those benefits from the
beneficiaries. The second tenet is that a party who takes value belonging to
67

Intermediate combinations of network and private benefits are more difficult to evaluate.
It might be the case that alliance networks characterized by low network benefits and high
private benefits for most alliance members could still be reasonably stable. For example,
Wal-Mart’s alliances with many retailers permits it to exercise its control and central
position in the network to extract a larger share of the network value as private benefits.
Nevertheless, its partners may be content to accept the high private benefits generated by the
alliance even if their network benefits are low. Dyer et al., supra note 38, at 146.
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others without reciprocating in kind must pay for the benefits she received.
Here we extend those two tenets beyond their current application under
prevailing law, and show how they could function in spiderless networks.
Part III then applies the model to the set of paradigmatic cases described
above where moral hazard and free riding risks hinder the formation and
operation of efficient networks.
A. Liability for Unrequested Benefits
1. Prevailing Law
When a benefactor voluntarily confers benefits upon recipients, the
law generally does not impose a duty of restitution on the recipient. This
rule has certain exceptions,68 however, and the common fund cases are the
most relevant to our analysis. "Common funds" are monies obtained
through legal proceedings initiated by one party against which others are
entitled to assert claims.69 Under certain conditions, the initiator of the legal
proceedings is entitled to collect from the other fund recipients their
relative shares in the expenses he incurred in the process, even if they
refused to back his efforts at the outset.70 An illustration is the case of an
heir who initiates legal proceedings resulting in an increase in the value of
the estate to the benefit of the other heirs.71 Another relevant category of
cases encompasses those instances in which one party protects or preserves
an interest he shares with another party, thereby benefiting the latter
without her prior consent to pay for this benefit.72 A common example is a
co-owner of property who incurs expenses to maintain or protect the
property, thereby benefiting the other co-owners.73 Here, the co-owner who
68

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. a (2011)
("the law of restitution for unrequested benefits, intentionally conferred, combines a broadly
negative proposition with a series of exceptions.").
69 For common fund cases, see John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public
Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974); Saul Levmore,
Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 95-99 (1985).
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30(2)(b), allows
recovery in cases where “the recipient obtains a benefit in money”, thereby substantially
broadening the common-funds category of cases. Section 29 sets out specific conditions
under which "a person who has incurred expenses or rendered services to preserve or create
a “fund” in which others are interested may require the others—in the absence of contract—
to contribute ratably to the cost of securing the common benefit".
71 For examples of suits brought by an heir against his or her co-heirs, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. g, illus. 23-25 (2011); 2 GEORGE
E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.7 (1978).
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 26-29 (2011). see also
HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 125–26 (2004) (presenting
exceptional cases in which the (previous) Restatement does allow restitution for unrequested
benefits); Levmore, supra note 69, at 65-68 (same).
73 2 PALMER, supra note 71, § 10.7(c); Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of
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bears the costs can recover from the others in the amount of their relative
shares.74
Several other categories of cases when restitution remedies are granted
for conferral of unrequested benefits offer further support for the general
principal that actions which preserve another’s economic interest can
trigger a right to restitution even in the absence of a prior understanding.75
To be sure, in each of these cases, the plaintiff must show that reaching an
agreement prior to the conferral of the benefit was infeasible or impractical,
that the benefactor was pursuing his own interests while the benefit to the
other party was incidental, and that the benefactor protected or preserved
existing entitlements and did not create new ones.76
2. Private Production of Public Goods
A principal application of an expanded duty of restitution is the
private production of public goods when, absent legal intervention, free
riding and other transaction costs bar their production. Assume, for
example, a benefactor considers constructing a park on her land that will
increase the market value of neighboring homes: the costs to the benefactor
in creating the park are higher than her private benefits, but lower than the
common benefits shared by her neighbors. The resulting benefits are a
public good: no one can prevent the beneficiaries from enjoying the
benefits of the park’s environment once it is created.77 But since each

Self-Interest, and the Limits of Free Riding, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 855–58 (2003).
74 See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, Ltd., 446 S.E.2d 415, 416–17 (S.C. 1994)
(holding that when one cotenant stops paying his share of taxes and mortgage payments,
other cotenants may pay his share and recover from him).
75 Rescue cases are another category of cases where recovery for unrequested benefits may
be granted See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20-21; 2
PALMER, supra note 71, § 10.4; see also Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1152 (1999) (analyzing rescue cases and supporting a broad duty of
restitution). These are instances where the benefactor has acted to protect the recipient’s life,
health, property, or other economic interest when the latter’s consent could not be obtained
due to the emergency nature of the circumstances. Under certain conditions, the law allows
the benefactor to recover a reasonable charge for his beneficial actions. For other categories,
see Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Good: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108
MICH. L. REV. 189, 195-98 (2009).
76 Limiting the restitution duty to those circumstances where high transactions costs render a
prior agreement implausible is quite obviously designed to encourage consensual
agreements. The rationales for the second and third conditions are less obvious. Requiring
the benefactor to be motivated by his own interests and only incidentally intent on
conferring benefits to others prevents the emergence of an extensive practice of sellers
providing benefits through avenues other than market transactions, while requiring the
protection and preservation of existing entitlements reflects the law’s preference for
maintaining the status quo over a broader principle of maximizing welfare. Porat, supra note
75, at 197-98.
77 Pure public goods are characterized by the inability to exclude people from consuming
them (“non-excludability”) and by the inability of one person’s consumption to detract from
or prevent another person’s consumption (“nonrivalry”). See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
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beneficiary knows that the creation of the public good does not depend on
his decision to share in the costs of production, no one is motivated to share
in the costs and as a consequence the economically beneficial park may not
be created. A properly designed restitution remedy can ameliorate this
inefficiency, however. Here, the goal of reducing enforcement costs, and in
particular the risk of overvaluation, argues for the recovery to be limited to
the lower of two measures—either the verifiable benefit gained by the
beneficiaries or their relative share of the reasonable costs of producing the
benefit.78 By allowing the benefactor to recoup a portion of his costs from
the beneficiaries in cases where the costs of evaluation are tractable and
market mechanisms or governmental intervention are not available, the
law can motivate the benefactor to act unilaterally and create the public
good to the benefit of all.79
If the duty of restitution were expanded as suggested above, it would
also be applicable to spiderless networks. Forming a spiderless network
(and providing collective benefits through it) is often the production of a
public good. As with other public goods it is susceptible to free riding that
risks the formation and operation of the network. These risks cannot readily
be overcome in spiderless networks through conventional contractual
solutions. Thus, as we explain in the following sections, high transaction
costs in the formation of strategic alliances and other spiderless networks
satisfy the main condition for imposing a duty of restitution.
B. Liability for Ill-Gotten Benefits
The most developed part of the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment not only obliges wrongdoers to compensate victims for harms
they suffered, but also to disgorge to them the gains received at their
expense.80 Traditionally, disgorgement is granted for intentional wrongs,
such as trespass on land.81 Suits for disgorgement of gains are also common
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 128–29 (3d ed. 2000). Whether the park is a pure public
good or just satisfies the non-excludability criterion is not relevant for our discussion.
78 There are several ways to reduce enforcement costs, including voting and licensing. In
addition, when the benefit is an increase in the market value of the beneficiaries' property, a
lien can be imposed on the property on behalf of the benefactor. Third party specialists
could purchase the lien for an immediate cash payment to the benefactor. Porat, supra note
75, at 212.
79 For a detailed discussion of the conditions for expanding the duty of restitution to
unrequested benefits cases, see Porat, id, at 194.
80 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 40-46
(2011) (Restitution for Wrongs); 1 PALMER, supra note 71, §§ 2.1-2.20 (acquisition of a
benefit through a wrongful act).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (2011) ("A person
who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, by comparable interference with
other protected interests in tangible property, or in consequence of such an act by another, is
liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong."). Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96
S.W.2d 1028 (1936) (disgorgement of profits awarded for commercial use of a cave
extending under defendant’s property); See also Owell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash.2d
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in trademark and copyright infringement cases; infringing trademarks thus
risks liability based on the infringer's ill-gotten gains rather than the harm
suffered.82 Disgorgement of gains is commonly awarded when one party
makes use of another’s property without his consent. If the action were
done with the other party's consent, restitution law typically would not
apply, since the transaction would be considered consensual and governed
by contract law. But under certain circumstances, a party who begins
performance of an illegal83 or other unenforceable agreement84 is entitled to
recover the benefits gained by the counterparty85 (and in some other cases
to recover for her reliance losses86). In yet other cases, courts award
quantum meruit, based either on an implicit contract or unjust enrichment,
when parties fail to agree on the fee for specified personal services.87 Thus,
282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946) (finding the wrongful user of an egg washing machine liable to its
owner for benefits derived from said usage). For an argument for disgorging gains in
accident cases, see Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2015).
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011) ("A person
who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or infringement of another's legally protected
rights in any idea, expression, information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to
the holder of such rights."); See, e.g., Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp.,
390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968) (ordering the disgorgement of profits accrued from the sale of
beer under the plaintiff's trade name).
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 (2011) ("A person
who renders performance under an agreement that is illegal or otherwise unenforceable for
reasons of public policy may obtain restitution from the recipient in accordance with the
following rules…"). See, e.g., Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 146 N.J. 140,
679 A.2d 1188 (1996) (awarding an attorney quantum meruit fee for services rendered
under a contract unenforceable for reasons of public policy). See generally John W. Wade,
Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1947)
(surveying exceptions to the maxim that a plaintiff has no standing in court to seek
restitution in connection with an illegal transaction).
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 (2011) ("A person
who renders performance under an agreement that cannot be enforced against the recipient
by reason of… indefiniteness… has a claim in restitution against the recipient as necessary
to prevent unjust enrichment."); See, e.g., Montanaro Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Snow, 190
Conn. 481, 460 A.2d 1297 (1983) (remanding a case for consideration of the extent to which
landowners had been enriched by receiving the purchasers' payments for an indefinite
option agreement).
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. i (2011)
("Restitution by the rule of this section is measured by the value of the claimant's
performance to the recipient"); See, e.g., Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d
1244, 1248 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, parties to a contract
that fails to materialize may be required to pay restitution for the value of benefits each has
conferred and the other has unjustly retained.").
86 See, e.g., McCrowell v. Burson, 79 Va. 290 (1884) (allowing a plaintiff to recover for
expenditures in preparing to perform an oral contract to build a house for the defendant
when the defendant later refused to permit the plaintiff to undertake the actual work of
construction); Abrams v. Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 346 (1962) ("under proper
circumstances a vendor or lessor may recover for work and material expended on his own
property in reliance on a void or unenforceable contract for its sale or rental").
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. e (2011) ("The
measure of recovery in quantum meruit—whether explained in terms of implied contract,
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restitution law sometimes applies as well to incomplete consensual
transactions and fills in gaps that the parties left unattended.
The potential application of disgorgement doctrine to spiderless
networks is straightforward. To see why, imagine that under certain
conditions the law recognized members' property rights in a network,88 so
that a new participant could share in network benefits only upon paying a
fee based on the expected benefits she receives and confers. Now assume
that advance permission for sharing the network's benefits is not feasible
because the benefit the new participant will receive or confer is uncertain,
or negotiation costs are prohibitively high. Under these circumstances, the
best analogy is the restitution cases discussed above where one party has
received benefits from another in an unenforceable agreement.89 By
analogy, the network members could be seen as having implicitly agreed
that the new member could join the network for a fee proportionate to the
expected benefits she receives and confers, but because of high transaction
costs have failed to agree on its amount in a fully binding contract. As in
the cases of unenforceable agreements discussed above, here also
restitution law could fill the gap and allow network participants to recover
from the new member an amount sufficient to prevent unjust enrichment.90
C. A Restitution Model
The discussion thus far shows that spiderless networks have three
central features relevant to restitution law: first, parties confer benefits on
others without their consent; second, parties often "take" benefits from
others without their consent; and third, consent cannot be achieved in both
cases due to high transaction costs.
We now develop an informal model to show how the principles of
restitution law outlined above can be extended and applied to support the
formation and operation of strategic alliances and other spiderless
networks. To clarify the analysis, we begin with several strong

unjust enrichment, or both—is the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services"). See also,
e.g., Paffhausen v. Balano, 708 A.2d 269 (Me. 1998) (ruling that a carpenter who had
received permission to renovate a building from its owner without properly agreeing on a
fee is entitled to recover for the reasonable value of labor and materials).
88 Would the law allow network members any protection from third parties who injure the
network? That might also depend on the "status" of the network as creating IP-like rights,
although for such protection much less than a property right is needed Cf. DAN B. DOBBS,
PAUL T. HAYDEN, ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 1006-09 (7th ed. 2013)
(discussing the liability for an intentional interference with prospective business
opportunity).
89 See supra note 84-87 and accompanying text.
90 As we explain in Part III, extending a disgorgement action to spiderless networks would
require common law courts first to recognize an appropriately limited right of recovery and
then to specify the proof conditions needed to overcome implementation concerns.
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assumptions: (a) courts can verify the costs and benefits of network
participation and operation at reasonable cost, and (b) the introduction of
legal remedies to support efficient networks complements the existing set
of relational norms that maintain cooperation and coordination among
network members. We develop our model by analyzing the most common
circumstances when free riding and moral hazard costs prevent efficient
formation and operation of networks.
1. Case 1: Unilateral Creation of Benefits with Passive Beneficiaries
Let’s start with the case of the industrial district cluster we discussed
in Part I.91 Imagine that when the owner of an enterprise that is a magnet
for other firms ("the anchor") moves to the district there are already a
number of smaller firms operating in the region that would expect to derive
substantial benefits from the presence of the anchor. Assume as well that
there is a substantial asymmetry of benefits conferred on each party in the
district: the anchor externalizes large benefits on the other firms, but
receives few benefits (or none) from them. Consequently, if the private
benefits the anchor expects to derive from relocation are less than its
private costs, the anchor may not move to the industrial district even when
the total social benefits—including the positive externalities conferred on
the other firms—exceed the anchor’s private costs.92 In order to provide the
anchor with efficient incentives to relocate its facilities to the industrial
district, it must be able to recoup at least the difference between private
costs and private benefits. A duty of restitution imposed on the existing
firms thus solves the free riding problem that motivates the incumbent
firms to decline to share in the costs of relocation.
Network value would be further enhanced if the anchor (who receives
private benefits from the move) can recover from the incumbents all of its
relocation costs making it better off as compared to its prior location. From
an efficiency perspective, the more benefits created by the network that are
internalized by the anchor, the more efficient are its incentives. Full
internalization of all the benefits created by the anchor provides it with
91

See supra Section I.A.2.
Parchomovsky & Siegelman have similarly noted that anchor stores may refrain from
moving to commercial districts due to their inability to internalize positive externalities.
However, in contrast to our approach, they propose that cities use pubic law to create
planned commercial districts, analogous to suburban malls, which would allow for the
capture of positive externalities among commercial establishments. See Gideon
Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211 (2012). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L.
REV. 1373 (2015) (criticizing Parchomovsky & Siegelman's suggested use of land use law
and offering alternative propositions designed to optimize urban agglomerations). Fennell
discusses the possibility raised by Porat, supra note 75, of applying restitution law between
benefactors and beneficiaries, but deems it largely inapplicable, stating that "a more intricate
system of payments for positive and negative externalities could be imagined, although
finding a workable way to administer it would be highly challenging".
92
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efficient incentives not only to relocate but also to operate within the
network for the benefit of all members. Furthermore, with full
internalization of the benefits, the benefactor would have efficient activity
level incentives, namely, to create the potential for the creation of the
benefits in the first place.93
To illustrate the advantages of full internalization of benefits in this
case, imagine that the anchor has to decide how to construct and operate its
enterprise once it moves to the new location. With full internalization of
benefits, the firm would take into account all the benefits, including those
conferred on others, in making investment decisions.94 However, if the
anchor recovers all the benefits externalized to the incumbents, then they
would not have efficient investment incentives. After all, their existence in
the industrial district is a "but-for" cause of the creation of the positive
externalities conferred upon them, and they also should invest under the
assumption that they will recoup the benefits they have generated either
actively or passively. Therefore, given the budget constraint that does not
allow all parties who "cause" the benefits to fully internalize them, the
passive enterprises properly should retain some of the benefits conferred by
the anchor.95
2. Case 2: Unilateral Creation of Benefits with Active Beneficiaries
Let's consider a variation to Case 1 and assume that no firms exist in
the geographic area, and that the owner of the anchor enterprise is expected
to attract small firms to locate nearby and form an industrial district once
the anchor relocates. We still assume that benefits are asymmetrical,
namely, that the anchor creates much more benefit for others than they
create for it.
The difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is that in Case 2 it is clear
that the motivation for the smaller firms to join the network is the presence
93

A similar argument has been famously made in the context of tort law: a strict liability
rule—or full internalization of harms—is a better mechanism than a negligence rule to
motivate injurers to take efficient non-verifiable precautions and efficiently reduce their
activity level. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
94 For a similar argument in the context of shopping mall contracts, see Eric D. Gould et al.,
Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 411, 419
(2005) (noting that "Externalities are generated not only by the presence of certain stores,
but also by the actions that stores take, such as advertising, maintaining cleanliness,
courtesy, and product variety... the performance of all stores is affected by the ongoing
efforts of the developer, such as maintaining the right mix of stores, renovations, parking,
cleanliness, and marketing campaigns", and arguing that each actor should be provided with
incentives to undertake the right amount of such activities).
95 This is how shopping center contracts internalize externalities. The developer gives the
anchor a portion of the externality created by the presence of the anchor, and then extracts
participation from non-anchor tenants through their lease terms. A contemporary example is
Amazon, which is itself a network, where the anchor tenant is paid by those who participate
and get the benefit of the participants that Amazon has drawn to a common (virtual) space.
We return to this point infra Section II.C.3.
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of the anchor. This difference has several implications. First, assuming
there is a duty of restitution obliging the smaller firms to compensate the
anchor for the benefits it confers, and assuming the amount of
compensation is known before the smaller firms relocate, the smaller firms
cannot claim that the duty of restitution makes them worse off. By
choosing to relocate they have demonstrated that paying compensation in
return for securing the benefits of membership in the industrial district
makes them better off in expectation. This argument does not apply in Case
1, where the smaller firms’ presence in the area implies nothing as to the
amount of benefits they have received from the anchor.
Second, a general objection to imposing liability for unrequested
benefits is that it infringes on the beneficiaries' autonomy: they are obliged
to pay for benefits that they have not agreed to purchase.96 Although there
are several responses to this objection, it does not apply to Case 2. By
participating in the network knowing that they are subject to a duty of
restitution, the smaller firms exhibit their willingness to receive the benefits
of the network and bear some of its costs.97 Third, in Case 2, more than in
Case 1, network success depends on allocating sufficient benefits to the
smaller firms to induce them to join the network. Since participating in the
network is costly for the smaller firms, they might decline to relocate
unless they can capture at least part of the benefits from participation in the
industrial district (at a minimum they would require an amount sufficient to
cover their relocation costs).
3. Case 3: Multilateral Creation of Benefits
In Case 3, all members in a strategic alliance network confer benefits
on each other and the question is how to provide all members with efficient
incentives to participate in the network and function optimally in
interactions with other members. In the self-organizing setting of the
strategic alliance network, formation and maintenance often are not
important until the network matures.98 As this process continues some
firms are more successful than others—there are winners and losers—and
the winners may then have a perverse incentive to exploit less successful
firms and capture a greater part of the externalities. In pursuing their own

96

Porat, supra note 75, at 215-17; Friedmann, supra note 73, at 846-47; Scott Hershowitz,
Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147 (2006).
97As noted above in Section II.B, joining an existing network might be considered
analogous to using someone's property following his consent but without agreeing on the
amount of the fee to be paid. This analogy will apply if the law recognizes a quasi-property
right of members in their networks. However, the argument is hardly relevant here where
firms merely located their facilities next to a cluster of enterprises on land they purchased or
leased.
98 Although in many circumstances even the decision to participate in a network entails
costs, as it requires firms to relocate as a precondition for participation. This is particularly
true in the case of clusters.
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interests, successful firms may not externalize sufficient benefits to the
other members to make it worthwhile for the latter to remain in the
network. These self-interested actions will cause the network to fail unless
the firms that have survived are also motivated to “build” or “maintain” the
network and operate efficiently within it. To be sure, under some
circumstances, permitting each member simply to retain the benefits that
are externalized by others without being compensated for the benefits it
externalizes will create efficient incentives to participate in maintaining the
network. For example, if there are six firms in the network, and each
confers 5 units of network value99 on others, receives 5 units of value in
return and incurs participation costs of 3 units, each one would have
efficient incentives to participate in the network and legal intervention
would be unnecessary.100
Things become more complicated, however, when (as is more likely)
some members' costs of participating in the network (including the
opportunity costs of not excluding less successful parties) are greater than
the benefits they receive, but less than the sum of the benefits they confer
and receive. To illustrate, assume that some firms confer 5 units of value on
others, receive benefits of 5 units from others, and bear 7 units of costs to
participate in the network. Although these firms create a net benefit of 3
units, they would not be motivated to participate in the network. In the case
just described, each firm’s contribution to the network is independent (Case
3.1), but in some cases the contributions to network functioning are
complements: the contribution of all or some parties in participating and
maintaining the network is greater than the sum of the individual
contributions of each one (Case 3.2). In yet other cases, the contributions of
network members are substitutes: only one party needs to expend costs to
maintain the network, and once the network functions all parties can freely
share the resulting benefits (Case 3.3).
Let's start with Case 3.3 where the contributions are substitutes. Here
the typical free riding problem arises: no single firm is motivated to
cooperate in ways that help to maintain the network, hoping that others will
do so. The problem would be acute if the costs of maintaining the network
are greater than any individual firm’s private benefit: in such a case, no one
has an interest in maintaining the network unless compensated by others.
Every potential network member would instead be motivated to free ride,
hoping that others would compensate the first mover. A duty of restitution
provides a solution here as in Cases 1 and 2: the firm that acts to stabilize
the network would be awarded restitution for creating a public good that
benefits all participants.101

We assume a “unit” is a universal measure of both network benefits and costs.
We ignore for the moment activity level effects and incentives to efficiently operate
within the network once it is formed. See supra text accompanying note 93.
101 See supra text following notes 92, 97.
99

100
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One difference between Case 3.3 and Cases 1 and 2 is that in those
latter cases it was clear the magnet firm should be incentivized to form the
network. In contrast, in Case 3.3, any firm that actually acts to maintain the
network receives compensation. Another difference between the cases is
the amount of compensation for the party who acts to maintain the network.
Since by assumption any of the potential participants can expend costs to
maintain the network in Case 3.3, network benefits are enhanced if
compensation is designed to motivate action by the most efficient party.
Thus, if efficient network maintenance costs 5 units, the member who
maintains the network should receive 5 units in restitution (minus its
relative share in the costs as a member of the network) regardless of actual
costs.102 In contrast to Cases 1 and 2, there is no reason in Case 3.3 to
award damages greater than reasonable (i.e., efficient) costs to the firm that
maintains the network (minus its relative share in those costs), since those
costs are the best measure of the benefits all participating firms have
received, given the alternative ways to maintain the network (through
actions by others).103
Cases 3.1 and 3.2 are more complicated. Ideally, each firm should
internalize all the benefits it creates. With full internalization all firms will
make efficient investment decisions whether to participate and how best to
operate in the network, and their activity levels also will be efficient.104
However, absent a state decision to subsidize all parties who create positive
externalities full internalization is impossible.105 The second best solution is
for each firm whose costs are higher than the benefits it receives from the
network ("losing firm") to recover from other participants (“winning
firms”) the lesser of (a) the difference between the losing firm’s reasonable
costs of participating in the network (Cr) and the benefits it received (Bin),
or (b) the benefits the losing firm confers on other members (Bex). Thus, in
our example, where each losing firm reasonably spent 7 units participating
in the network, received a benefit of 5 units and conferred a benefit of 5
units, any losing firm would be entitled to reimbursement of at least 2 units
from the winning firms. Encouraging the losing firm to participate in the
network, however, requires as well a modest premium above Cr-Bin:
otherwise the firm would be indifferent between participation and non-

102

We assume that all networks yield the same benefits once formed and stabilized.
Otherwise, compensation would need to be adapted to account also for subsequent
deficiencies in the operation of the network.
103 One could also imagine that with Cases 1 and 2 that there was competition over which
magnet enterprise would relocate its business operations to the proposed cluster, and if the
firm that actually relocated had not done so, other magnet enterprises would have acted to
relocate. In such case, the benefits to other firms might be the costs of relocation rather than
the positive externalities they can capture.
104 But see infra text following note 113.
105 Full subsidies to all participants would provide them with efficient incentives assuming
they do not collude; indeed, with such subsidies firms do have strong incentives to collude
and create excessive benefits.
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participation.
Interestingly, in cases where there is an upper limit on network
membership, and when Cr-Bin< Bex (as in our previous numerical example),
Cr-Bin, rather than Bex, is the best way to measure the benefit the losing firm
conferred upon others. To understand why, assume that there are many
potential losing firms with the same expected participation costs and
benefits that compete in maintaining the network and are motivated to
participate if awarded slightly more than Cr-Bin. Under those
circumstances, the minimum payment necessary to induce a losing firm to
participate in the network adequately represents the benefit conferred upon
members from the losing firm’s participation.106
Damages in the amount of Cr-Bin is consistent with other solutions
provided by restitution law for analogous cases. In most cases where the
law allows benefactors to receive reimbursement for unrequested benefits,
the measure of recovery is the reasonable (net) costs incurred rather than
the benefits conferred (as long as the former is lower than the latter). 107
There are several justifications for limiting recovery to reasonable costs
incurred, including the goal of avoiding the over-production of benefits due
to over-evaluation108 or analogous moral hazard risks.109 But another
plausible explanation is the one we have proposed here: when more than
one person can serve as the benefactor, the benefit conferred by the
benefactor is worth no more than the payment necessary to induce the next
person in line to confer that same benefit.
4. Case 4:Increasing (or Decreasing) Costs of Joining the Network
Consider again the industrial district example we discussed in Case 1.
Imagine that there are six potential firms in the network, each confers 5
units of value on the other firms, and receives benefits of 5 units from the
others. Here, however, the costs of joining the network increase as
additional firms join the network (although six is the upper limit): the first
mover’s costs of participation are 2 units, the second firm’s costs are 3
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Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371(A) (1981) (measuring restitution by
"[t]he reasonable value to the other party of what he received in terms of what it would have
cost him to obtain it from a person in the claimant's position"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(2) (2011) ("Enrichment from a money payment
is measured by the amount of the payment or the resulting increase in the defendant's net
assets, whichever is less").
108 Levmore, supra note 69, at 69-72; Porat, supra note 75, at 209-10.
109 Cf. William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91-93 (1978)
(arguing the prizes for rescue might encourage excessive investments in rescue operations);
Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the
Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 886-89 (1986) (arguing that prizes for
rescue motivate potential rescuers to put potential rescuees under peril in order to then
rescue them and win the prize).
107
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units, and so on. Thus, total expected costs are 27 units and total expected
benefits are 30 units for a net benefit of 3 units. The different costs could
result from various circumstances: infrastructure investments in creating
the cluster may be less costly at the outset, but, as the cluster forms, real
estate costs increase along with labor costs thus requiring a greater initial
capital investment by any participating firm.110
Facilitating the formation of a network when costs of joining the
network either increase or decrease over time, requires that all participating
firms receive a share in the network's surplus proportionate to the benefits
they create for others and the costs they have incurred. Since, in our
example, all member firms receive and confer the same benefits, sharing
costs equally would be the optimal solution.111 Otherwise, the network
would fail to mature as later movers would abandon (or be excluded from)
the cluster.
Alternatively, if the change in costs were reversed and early parties
faced higher costs than later arrivals—for example, because of the greater
risk of losing their initial investment if the network fails to function—the
cluster might fail to form at all. In this case, even if the first mover’s costs
were lower than benefits, but still higher than the costs of the next firms to
join the network, no firm would volunteer to be the first mover, hoping to
free ride and reap more benefits from later participation. Only an equal
sharing in costs—or even a bonus for the firms that were the first to join—
can solve this particular free riding problem.
5. Allocating the Network's Surplus
In all the cases discussed above, one or more potential network
members should be reimbursed by others in order to motivate the former to
participate in or maintain the network. The legal justification for
reimbursement is the value to the network of approximating a reciprocity
equilibrium: some members either conferred uncompensated benefits on
others and should recover from them,112 or instead took benefits from
others and should pay for them.113 The question that arises is what happens
after each losing party is paid for the difference between her costs and
benefits (Cr-Bin): how should the network surplus be allocated among the
participating firms? Ideally, the law would provide more benefits to those
firms that can either affect the level of positive externalities they create
110

See e.g., the discussion of the Silicon Valley cluster, infra Section III.A. To be sure, as
noted in text the reverse could also arise where costs of participation decrease over time, for
example, perhaps the risk to first movers is higher since there is some likelihood that the
network will fail before its formation is stabilized.
111 Although in our example, each firm receives and confers the same units of benefits, that
does not imply that total benefits remain unchanged over time. In order for the cluster to
succeed, total benefits should increase as costs increase.
112 Supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (the unrequested benefits cases).
113 Supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (the disgorgement of gains cases).
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more than others or are more susceptible to activity level effects. But this
capability or susceptibility is often impossible to identify, especially when
creation of benefits is multilateral.
In the alternative, a reciprocity equilibrium can be maintained by
allocating the network's surplus according to the net benefits received and
benefits conferred. This is justified by fairness considerations (the more
benefits you confer the larger share of the surplus you get), but even more
importantly, it functions better as a default rule for network members,
encouraging them to regulate their network relationships through
contract.114 More specifically, when contributions are independent115 each
member is entitled to half of the sum of the net benefits received and the
benefits conferred.116 This is a Nash bargain solution, and as such it
represents the most plausible division of the surplus the parties would have
made if they could have reached an agreement.117
To illustrate this solution, assume there are six firms in the network,
three firms each receive a net benefit of 1 unit of value and confer benefits
of 5 units (A members), while the other three each receive a net benefit of 5
units and confer benefits of 1 unit (B members). The total benefit generated
by the network is 18 units. Take the A members first: Each firm is entitled
to 3 units (half of the sum of the net benefits received and the benefits
conferred). Since A members already receive 1 unit, they should recover 2
units in restitution. Consider now the B members: Each firm is also entitled
to 3 units. Since B members have received 5 units, they should pay 2 units
to the A members. In this example, all network members will receive the
same share of the gains from the network. Of course, this is not always so.
Assume, for example, that one firm confers 18 units of benefit and receives
nothing, another firm receives 10 units of benefit and confers nothing, and
the four other firms receive 2 units of benefit each, and confer nothing.
Here, the first firm is entitled to recover 9 units (5 from the firm that
114

Contracting in this context includes the full array of controlling mechanisms, from
creating master contracts to the bureaucratic structures common in co-ops and trade
associations.
115 Supra text following note 100 (case 3.1).
116 When contributions are complements, supra text following note 100 (case 3.2), the
allocation would still be according to the net benefits received and benefits conferred but
would leave each member less than half of the sum of the net benefits received and the
benefits conferred. To see why, imagine a network of 3 members, creating together a total
net benefit of 18 units, equally shared by them (i.e., each receives a net benefit of 6 units).
Let's assume now that each member's contribution is a "but for" cause of the entire benefits
of 18 units (full complements). Obviously, a Nash bargaining solution would yield each one
6 units, as it naturally happens in our example. Six units, of course, is less than half of the
sum of benefits received (6 units) and conferred (12 units).
117 Assuming similar utility functions, players in a Nash bargaining situation are expected to
come to a resolution that splits the surplus evenly among them. Guillermo Owen, Game
Theory, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 57880 (James D. Wright ed., 2nd ed., 2015). The Nash bargaining solution is predicated upon
four axioms. Assuming similar utility functions, the outcome which satisfies all axioms is
one in which the parties divide the surplus evenly. Id. at 578.
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received 10 units, and 1 unit from each of the other four that received 2
units).
Note that network members sometimes should be denied any sharing
in the surplus. Assume there is an upper bound on the size of the network
and there are enough candidates who are willing to participate. In such a
case, if existing members had not joined the network, someone else would
have joined in their place. Assuming also that the court knows these facts,
there is a good reason not to allow existing members to recover more than
Cr-Bin: although their presence in the network would have created benefits,
those benefits would have been created without them. Nonetheless,
awarding them Cr-Bin is essential, since otherwise neither they nor their
substitutes will participate in the network. Note, however, that when those
members could affect the benefits conferred on others (namely, they are
active rather than passive), leaving them with at least part of the network
surplus might improve their incentives to maximize the surplus.
6. Negative Externalities
Networks can create negative externalities, side by side with positive
externalities. Thus, in the case of a cluster of industrial firms, although
many firms would receive benefits from the magnet firm, other firms in the
area might suffer harms. One might imagine two types of harms that result
from the development of an industrial district: (1) driving out the nonnetwork businesses in the area, and (2) increasing the cost of entry to nonnetwork firms that locate in or near the cluster. In order to properly
motivate all parties, both positive and negative externalities should count.
How should they count?
First, some or all network members might be required to compensate
victims for harm suffered. Those harms should count as costs and be taken
into account in calculating the recovery the firm is entitled to or the
payments it should make to other members. Second, even without liability
for harms, when accounting for negative externalities, courts applying a
restitution regime should tailor the remedies among the network members.
For example, if, as in Cases 1 & 2, the magnet firm creates negative
externalities together with the positive externalities, its recovery against the
other firms is reduced, with the limit of the difference between positive and
negative externalities.118
7. Summary
The restitution model developed above supports the following
propositions:
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See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1450–52 (2007)
(warning of the risk of allowing actors to recover for their positive externalities and using
the recoveries for compensating for negative externalities).
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First, the operation of a spiderless network is efficiently supported
where each firm in the network is allowed to capture all of the benefits its
participation in the network creates for the firm and others. Full
internalization of benefits provides each network member efficient
incentives to participate in maintaining the network and to make efficient
investment decisions before and after its decision to participate.
Second, since restitution law by itself cannot effect full internalization
by each network member, the model supports restitution remedies that best
approximate a reciprocity equilibrium where the network surplus is divided
among firms according to each member's benefits conferred and costs
incurred.
Third, where there are impediments to achieving a reciprocity
equilibrium, the model supports permitting each firm whose participation
in the network is efficient to retain (and, if necessary to recover) benefits
sufficient to ensure its participation.
Fourth, variance in the costs of participating in the network are
relevant in decisions allocating costs and benefits, as costs may differ over
time such that early (later) participation that is more costly than later
(earlier) participation may deter network formation and functioning.
Fifth, the presence of magnet enterprises whose incentives to operate
within the network have disproportionately greater influence on efficient
network formation justifies a differential allocation of costs and benefits.
***
In this Part, we have proposed a model in a friction-free environment
that applies restitution remedies to a range of cases where free riding and
moral hazard costs create asymmetries in the distribution of net benefits
from network participation. In the following Part we relax the strong
assumptions of the model, evaluate the utility of restitution remedies in a
more realistic setting and suggest how extending a right of restitution to
members of spiderless networks in certain circumstances can enhance the
welfare gains from the increasing trust and cooperation that results from
participation in the network.

III. IMPLEMENTING A RESTITUTION REGIME
The preceding analysis has identified both the fragility of many
spiderless networks and demonstrated how restitution remedies have the
potential of approximating a reciprocity equilibrium that contributes to
efficient network functioning. In adjusting and tailoring the quantum of
restitution damages in any particular case, the goal is to balance the high
costs of verifying network costs and benefits against the goal of sufficient
internalization to improve network performance. That objective argues in
most cases for a low-powered remedial scheme, one that applies the
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minimum remedy necessary to deter the self-interested actions that impair
the mutual trust and cooperation essential to the efficient operation of
spiderless networks.119 This means that in most cases network members
could seek to recover from other members no more than the difference
between their costs of participating in the network and the benefits they
received from it.120
In this Part, we illustrate how such a scheme of narrowly tailored
restitution remedies can function successfully in real world spiderless
networks. Section III.A considers whether and how a limited restitution
duty would apply in the case of the four exemplars of uncompensated
externalities described in Part I. In Section III.B, we then show how these
low-powered restitution remedies can work as complements to the informal
norms that currently govern network relationships. Section III.C takes up
some of the objections to authorizing common law courts to entertain even
a limited right of restitution for firms in spiderless networks. We conclude
in Section III.D that even if a claim for restitution by one network firm
against another is rarely successful, by specifying the parameters of a claim
the law can function as a bargain-enabling default (a virtual spider as it
were) that encourages parties in spiderless networks to coordinate around
contractual mechanisms that promote network reciprocity.

A.Applying Low-Powered Restitution Remedies to the Four
Exemplars
1. Magnet Firms and Late Arrivals
The general case of magnet firms was analyzed in detail in Part II, so
here we focus specifically on the Silicon Valley case.121 The question is
what should happen when a research institute (like Stanford University),
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Adopting a minimal or low-powered remedial scheme furthers another goal—to reduce
chilling and crowding out effects, as we explain in detail in Section III.B.
120 To be clear, some extension of common law restitution doctrine is required to implement
any regime of restitution remedies for spiderless networks. As we have explained, our
normative argument is grounded in two fundamental tenets of restitution law: (1) under
certain conditions a party who voluntarily confers benefits upon others can recover the value
of those benefits from the beneficiaries; and (2) a party who takes value belonging to others
without reciprocating in kind must pay for the benefits she received. In order to apply these
tenets to spiderless networks, common law courts must extend existing law to specific
instances of opportunistic behavior that threaten network cooperation. In doing so, courts
disposed to extend restitution remedies to network members that suffer moral hazard or free
riding costs must of necessity consider a number of implementation issues beyond the scope
of this paper, such as whether damages should be awarded ex ante (for potential benefits) or
ex post (for realized benefits), how the burdens of proof should be allocated among the
parties, and how best to assess restitution claims.
121 Supra Section I.C.1.
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several computer technology related firms, and venture capitalists attract
startup companies to relocate in their vicinity, thereby allowing them to
capture many benefits, for which they don't pay? The Silicon Valley case is
close to Case 2 in the restitution model (unilateral creation of benefits with
active beneficiaries)122 where a magnet firm attracts many other entities to
relocate nearby and form a cluster network. In such cases, there is an
efficiency justification for allowing the magnet enterprise —or other core
members that generate substantial externalities—to capture a substantial
portion of the network's surplus and in any event at least recover the
difference between costs and benefits. The question then is whether
Stanford University in our example, as well as other magnet firms that
"established" the Silicon Valley network, received enough of the network's
surplus.
Answering the particular case requires more facts, but consider how
the restitution regime would work in similar cases whenever a research
institute (RI) considers bringing a claim against other network members,
say a startup firm that allegedly captured uncompensated benefits from the
RI. At the outset, the RI must show that both firms belong to the same
network, namely, that there were repeated interactions between the parties,
that they engaged in interrelated business activities and that the RI
conferred benefits on the startup firm (or that the startup "took" benefits
from the RI). It is likely that the RI participates in more than one network:
it might produce information regarding the biological foundation of various
drug therapies to which particular startup enterprises benefitted and also
produce information relating to the development of new computing
technologies with benefits accruing to other startup firms.
Next, the RI would need to show that it generated information that
diffused throughout the network—say, information about network partners
capable of collaborating on developing a particular drug therapy—that was
“used” by the defendant startup, perhaps with the participation of other
network firms, in developing relationships that resulted in a new drug. The
RI would then be entitled to show how much it invested in research
capabilities to build these successful partnerships, including the costs of
manpower, materials and laboratory facilities—as against any
corresponding benefits (say, from grants, tuition revenues, patents, and
enhanced charitable contributions). If the court finds that benefits are lower
than costs, it may award the RI the defendant‘s share of the difference, or
an approximation of it, as restitution damages.123 And if the RI can prove it
is a magnet firm, the restitution regime contemplates a more generous
recovery above net costs (and even if the magnet’s benefits clearly exceed
its costs).
122

Supra Section II.C.2.
In theory, all beneficiary firms in the network are liable for a portion of the restitution
damages according to their share in the network's surplus: Thus, the court would need to
estimate that share with respect to the defendant firm.
123
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The Silicon Valley case raises the additional problem of late arrivals
similar to Case 4 in the model (increasing costs of joining the network).
Here, firms that are willing to join the network at a later stage may face
higher costs relative to earlier arriving firms. How are late arrivals
encouraged to join the cluster rather than move to another location? First, a
startup that arrives later and subsequently realizes benefits from the
network would be entitled (with an ex post remedy) to offset higher costs
attributable to late entry against any future liability in restitution brought by
other cluster members to recover uncompensated benefits. Furthermore, if
its participation costs exceed its benefits, the late-arriving firm would be
entitled to recoup the difference from firms that realized net benefits from
the network.
This solution is inadequate, however, in a case where every firm
incurs a net benefit. Here, it is tempting to consider awarding ex ante
damages equal to the difference between early and late arrival costs. This
option, however, begs the question how those incremental costs are to be
allocated among other network members, especially when it is unclear who
(if anyone) is an (ex post) beneficiary. Given this problem, ex post
compensation is the preferable solution, permitting firms that create ex post
benefits for network members to recoup the incremental cost of late arrival,
even if their benefits exceed their costs. Damages for the incremental cost
of late arrival would then be allocated among network members in the
same way as a losing member's net costs are allocated.124
2. Freeriding on Indirect Ties
In the Apple-Sony case,125 the information Sony acquired indirectly
from IBM was used by Sony to develop, together with Apple, the laptop
computer and also used to advance Sony’s business interests in consumer
electronics. Thus, in the network composed in part of Apple, Sony and
IBM, IBM conferred benefits on both Apple and Sony but only had an
alliance contract with Apple: the question arises whether IBM is entitled to
restitution damages given the uncompensated network benefits it conferred
on Sony. We assume that neither Sony nor Apple committed a justiciable
wrong since the information derived from IBM that Sony used was not
protected by IP law,126 and we further assume that Apple was not in breach
of its contract with IBM. Indeed, it is common in strategic alliance
networks for one party to acquire information from a contract partner that
has been acquired by the contract partner in collaboration with third parties.
One way to approach the problem is through the traditional tools of
contract law: the contract between IBM and Apple arguably accounted for
124

Supra Section II.C.3.
Supra Section I.C.2.
126 We assume the information is “know-how” that is not subject to property right
protection.
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the possibility of information being made available to Sony (or other third
parties) and the alliance contract priced it accordingly. Relying on the
alliance contract to internalize the subsequent benefits to third parties is
sub-optimal, however. Not only do the contracting parties face substantial
uncertainty at time of contract, which makes pricing a formidable task, but
ex ante pricing also provides the party possessing the information
inadequate incentives to share it with the counterparty, knowing the
information might later be used in alliances between the counterparty and
third parties. Thus, if IBM has been paid ex ante for the subsequent use of
its private information by Apple and Sony, IBM would fail to consider any
future benefits that Sony – or Sony's counterparts – might derive from that
information in deciding what information to share in its alliance contract
with Apple and what information to withhold.
An alternative solution is to realize that IBM, Apple and Sony are part
of a strategic alliance network, where IBM conferred substantial network
benefits on Apple and Sony but (potentially) received fewer benefits in
return. Thus, the Apple-Sony case is a variation of our Case 3.2
(multilateral creation of benefits where contributions to network
functioning are complements).127 An award of restitution damages to IBM
gives parties in IBM’s position an incentive to share information with
alliance partners, such as Apple even if they appreciate the risk that the
information will ultimately be used by third party competitors (like Sony).
But how could restitution remedies be implemented in a case like this?
We assume that all three parties' efforts and expertise combined and
resulted in the development and manufacturing of the new laptops and
more innovative consumer electronics and that IBM did not receive any
compensating benefits. Hence, IBM could seek to recover restitution
damages from Sony and Apple: the court would need to estimate IBM's
contribution to the new laptops and consumer electronics produced by
Sony and Apple respectively and determine the percentage of the profits
made by Sony and/or Apple that should be attributed to information
generated by IBM. From that percentage, the court could determine the
quantum of damages to award to IBM. Consistent with the imposition of
low-powered restitution remedies, however, a court would need to be
appropriately cautious to avoid awarding damages that are higher than
IBM's true contribution to the realized profits. Any uncertainty would
properly be resolved in Sony's (and Apple's) favor in order to reduce any
chilling effects on entrepreneurs who might fear that some of the profit
they realize from innovation might subsequently be attributed to
information derived indirectly from other network participants.

127

Supra Section II.C.2.
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3. Exploiting "Structural Holes"
In the Tata Group case,128 one large Indian firm—Tata Group—uses
valuable information it received from smaller Indian firms for its own
benefit. The difficult question is whether the smaller firms should be
entitled to some of the network's surplus that currently is captured mostly
by Tata. If Tata is a magnet enterprise, as in Case 2 in the model,129
allowing it to retain a large portion of the network surplus is the right
solution. In this way, Tata would secure an appropriate return from sharing
its reputational benefits with other network members. When Tata is
allowed to capture the greater part of network benefits, it is motivated to
make more efficient decisions regarding the network's operation and
composition than if it had to disgorge a substantial portion of its profits.
At the same time, however, not allowing the smaller Indian firms any
share in the network surplus above what they receive from their mere
participation in alliances with foreign entities is likely to deter some of
those firms from participating in the network. That destabilizing result
would occur when those firms determined that the expected costs of
participation—in particular the costs of disclosing valuable private
information to Tata that could adversely affect their business
opportunities—would be prohibitive.
The fact that Tata is a magnet firm, together with the need to attract
the small Indian firms to participate in the network, argues for limiting any
claim against Tata to the amount of net costs incurred by any one of the
smaller firms (Cr-Bin), plus a modest premium: most of the network surplus
should remain with Tata, but the smaller firms' incentives to join the
network would increase. Indeed, in theory, it might be appropriate to allow
Tata to recover from the subset of smaller firms who benefitted
significantly through the network. Assuming, however, that Tata’s
positional monopoly has permitted it to capture rents, it is doubtful whether
this solution is justified given the difficulties of proof.
The Tata case might be difficult to resolve unless an expert tribunal
such as the Delaware Chancery Court, had jurisdiction to hear restitution
claims in spiderless networks. An expert tribunal can more readily sort the
complex interaction between the benefits properly attributable to Tata’s
position in the network as the reputational intermediary from the rents that
are attributable to its positional monopoly. Moreover, this case is an
appropriate one for an information revelation mechanism: the emerging
doctrine could develop a rule that any firm that joined the network after a
fee request from a central firm such as Tata is deemed to have accepted a
legally binding offer thus making any subsequent restitution claims
redundant.

128
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Supra Section I.C.3
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4. Exploiting Informational Synergies
In the Microsoft case,130 one large firm has many strategic alliances
and, as a consequence of its central position in the network, it can exploit
informational synergies to capture a larger share of the future projects
available to network members. The knowledge and expertise in pursuing
future business opportunities resulting from this synergy of information is
not traceable to any other network member or alliance partner. Should
Microsoft's alliances share in the gains obtained by Microsoft?
The problem this case poses for imposing a restitution remedy is that
it is especially difficult to measure the contribution of any given network
member or alliance partner to the gains made by Microsoft at a later stage.
At the same time, however, there is the reluctance of some firms to do
business with Microsoft exactly for the reason that they fear being
"exploited."131 Thus, the Microsoft case is similar to Case 3.2 in the
restitution model (multilateral creation of benefits when contributions are
complements),132 but with the complication that one firm (Microsoft) may
also be a magnet enterprise (similar to Case 2133). In such cases, leaving
some of the network surplus to the peripheral firms (in addition to what
they would receive by their participation in the network) is a plausible
solution that would motivate more firms to participate fully in sharing
private information with others and, in particular, with the centrally
embedded firm.
The question remains, however: can the measurement and evaluation
problems this case poses be overcome? As long as the legal objective is
modest, a limited restitution remedy would improve internalization of
network benefits. This argues for reimbursing the verifiable net costs (CrBin) of Microsoft’s alliance partners, plus a fixed premium. Moreover, if CrBin is not verifiable, a court motivated to support spiderless networks has
available the alternative suggested above for the Sony-Apple exemplar:
once Microsoft realizes substantive benefits from a new product and the
plaintiff can show that its extra-contractual private information was used by
Microsoft in developing the new product, the plaintiff is eligible to recover
damages measured by the relative contribution of the plaintiff’s
information to the development of the new product.
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Supra Section I.C.4
Supra text accompanying note 66.
132 Supra text following note 100.
133 Supra Section II.C.2.
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B. Crowding Out and Chilling Effects

1. The Crowding Out Problem
The preceding analysis suggests that when evaluation problems are
tractable, access to a restitution remedy can potentially ameliorate the
moral hazard, free riding and other transactions costs impediments to
network survival.134 But introducing a potential legal sanction raises a
further challenge to the extension of restitution remedies to the network
setting. Would these legal remedies crowd out the informal, relational
forces that appear to work well in some spiderless networks?
Theory suggests that cooperating parties should aim to capture the
benefits of both formal and informal enforcement of reciprocity norms by
relying on formal legal remedies to solve complex problems with noisy
interactions and on informal methods (whether grounded in reputation,
repeated interactions or reciprocity) to enforce contingencies that are
difficult to verify but clear enough to be observable.135 A mixed strategy is
feasible if formal and informal enforcement regimes can be complements
but not if they are substitutes where recourse to formality “crowds out" the
operation of informality. Here existing theory and evidence offer limited
guidance. Experimental research has demonstrated that, in some instances,
formal sanctions do crowd out informal mechanisms.136 But the fact that
formal and informal means of enforcing reciprocal relationships are
potentially rivalrous does not mean that a mixed strategy is necessarily
inferior or impossible.137
How, then, do formal legal obligations to abide by a normative
command interact with compliance based on trust and reciprocity? One of
us has argued in an earlier paper that crowding out occurs when the legal
sanction degrades the information about the character of the counterparties
and the cooperative nature of their interactions.138 First, consider the effects
of introducing a legal sanction on how the participants perceive the nature
of their interaction. The most familiar example is the experiment using
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For examples of moral hazard and free riding problems in a variety of networks, see infra
Sections I.C.1-4.
135 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23, at 1386, 1398-99 ("When outcomes can be verified
by courts empowered to compel disclosure of relevant information, formal contracts are
preferred; when outcomes are hard to characterize, and therefore difficult to verify, but are
observable to the parties, informal contracts are feasible").
136 See e.g., Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, When Punishment
Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
509 (2008); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary
Cooperation? UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH, INSTITUTE FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
(2000) and sources cited infra note 139.
137 Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the
Limits of Coercion, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 551, 579-80 (2004).
138 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23, at 1399.
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formal sanctions to cause parents to pick up their children from day care on
time. To improve punctuality, a fine was imposed for tardiness. The
perverse result was an increase in late pickups because the formal fine
“crowded out” the reputation-based norm.139 Tardy behavior was no longer
considered a breach of a moral obligation; it was transformed into a market
transaction in which a parent had the “right” to pay for delay and thus felt
unconstrained by being tardy.
A second factor contributing to the crowding out effect is the impact
of formal legal sanctions on the frequency or incidence of the cooperative
behavior that supports relational norms. When legal sanctions are keyed to
all outcome variables, a “high-powered” legal sanction suppresses the
production of information that supports reciprocity.140 The effect of highpowered sanctions is to increase the consequences of non-compliance: The
threat of a severe sanction leads parties to share less information about their
desire to make cooperative adjustments to the relationship. Thus, parties
facing high-powered sanctions for non-compliance communicate less about
the problems they are experiencing and consequently have fewer
opportunities to make mutually beneficial reciprocal adjustments over time.
In a sense, high-powered legal enforcement intended to create efficient
incentives to perform specified actions functions as a “first strike” nuclear
weapon, where each party continually faces the risk that a single misstep
can transform a surplus-generating cooperative enterprise into a zero sum
game.141
Given the crowding out risk, courts concerned to preserve
complementarity in spiderless networks should be motivated to impose
low-powered remedies designed to encourage compliance with the
information exchange regime (and the informal relations it supports) while
avoiding the high-powered sanctions that incentivize the behavior that
crowds out informality.142 In this way, legal sanctions would be applied
only to those actions that are critical to maintaining and supporting the
139

Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). For an
extensive literature in social psychology that also considers the crowding out of intrinsic
motivations, see Edward L. Deci, R. Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review
of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivations, 125
PSYCH. BULL. 627 (1999).
140 High powered enforcement consists in the imposition of standard legal remedies for
failure to perform specified contractual obligations: enforcement is tied to outcome
variables and provides incentives for parties to take specified actions to maximize expected
surplus. In contrast, low powered enforcement consists in imposing sanctions only for the
verifiable failures to reciprocate but not for the failure of the parties to invest sufficiently in
the underlying business activity so as to yield particular outcomes. Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
supra note 23, at 1399.
141 The threat of the ultimate sanction thus deters parties from voluntarily revealing the
information needed for the counterparty to adjust informally. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69
VA. L. REV. 967, 1011–18 (1983).
142 See supra note 140.
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formation and operation of the network.
Moreover, crowding out in this context is unlikely in any event
because the normative structure of business networks is parsimonious.
There is no norm of altruism among business firms. No firm is implicitly
obligated to cooperate with other network members and produce value for
them, even if the cooperating member loses value. There is also no norm of
risk sharing among network members who are not in a direct contractual
relationship. A firm that gains benefits from the network has no implicit
obligation to compensate a firm that cooperated with others in the network
but incurred net losses. In sum, the low-powered legal remedy
contemplated by imposing a duty of restitution cannot crowd out altruism
and risk-sharing norms for the simple reason that those norms do not exist
in a spiderless business network. To be sure, there are network norms of
reciprocity and cooperation but, as we have argued and as the experimental
data support, a low-powered restitution remedy is most likely to
complement rather than to substitute for those existing norms.143
2. Chilling Effects
Liability sometimes chills desirable activities. In tort law, judicial
errors cause chilling effects when injurers expect liability even for benign
behaviors.144 The risk of liability might encourage them inefficiently to
reduce their activity level. Would the restitution duties outlined above chill
desirable activities?
Consider Case 2 in the restitution model (unilateral creation of
benefits with active beneficiaries).145 Here, a magnet firm relocates and
small firms consider moving to its vicinity in order to capture positive
externalities produced by the magnet firm. Assume that those firms are
exposed to liability risks under a restitution regime. They might anticipate
that error costs will lead to liability in restitution that exceed the benefits
they expect to capture from the magnet firm. As a consequence, the small
143

The experimental data suggests that informal norms and legal remedies are complements
when each strategy reinforces the effectiveness of the other. Thus, a legal sanction that
covers some but not all of the parties’ obligations complements existing norms if the
remaining obligations can be enforced informally. Sergio Lazzarini, Gary J. Miller & Todd
R. Zenger, Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and
Informal Arrangements, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 261 (2004); Mary Rigdon, Trust and
Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 93 (2009). Furthermore,
the reciprocity equilibrium, if achieved, might stabilize existing networks and make their
operation more efficient. In this way, restitution might create a new norm of fairer, and more
efficient, sharing of networks' surplus, according to each member's contribution. See
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Importance of Being Earnest: Two Notions of
Internalization 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 37, 58 (2015) (arguing that mild sanction is likely to
reinforce voluntary compliance).
144 Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences? 67
STAN. L. REV. 1303 (2015) (arguing that chilling effects should be a major concern in setting
standards of proof).
145 Supra Section II.C.2.
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firms may elect not to relocate even when relocation is efficient. In
contrast, in the absence of expected liability the firms would relocate in
order to capture positive network benefits from the magnet firm.
There are several reasons why this risk of chilling effects should not
lead a court to reject a claim for restitution. First, in a world without legal
remedies there are offsetting efficiency losses caused by large-scale
externalities that threaten the viability of a spiderless network: without a
mechanism to internalize the externalities, for example, a magnet firm may
choose not to relocate to an emerging industrial district and no network will
be formed, or, even if it did relocate, the network would not function to
maximize the entire network surplus. Second, chilling effects are reduced
when sanctions are low-powered: in the magnet firm cases (Cases 1 and 2
in the model), the magnet firm recovers less than the entire benefits it
created for the others. Any chilling effect is reduced as smaller firms
anticipate retaining measurable benefits. Third, chilling effects might be
reduced with an ex ante remedy; with such a remedy each firm would be
able to know at an early stage, even before joining the network, the
approximate liability (or entitlement) it might bear and decide accordingly
whether or not to join. And finally, firms can engage in standard risk
management techniques until insurance markets evolve to reduce the
variance in liability caused by high rates of error.

C. Further Objections
1. Governmental Intervention
A possible objection to extending restitution remedies to spiderless
networks is that there are more effective ways to solve the moral hazard
and free riding problems we have identified. Thus, for example, the state
might better solve the problem through a scheme of taxes and subsidies.
Particularly in the case of clusters of industrial districts, local authorities
could serve as a spider: they could levy taxes on firms who create negative
externalities, or who internalize more benefits from the network than what
they externalize to other firms, and subsidize firms that externalize more
benefits than they internalize.146 Local authorities can also use their
governmental powers to organize industrial districts in a way that
approximates a reciprocity equilibrium.147
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For similar proposals, see supra note 92.
Consider the creation of a “business improvement district” (“BID”). A BID is a publicprivate partnership in which property and business owners of a defined area elect to make a
collective contribution to the maintenance, development, and promotion of their commercial
district. They typically provide services such as street and sidewalk maintenance, publicsafety officers, park and open-space maintenance, marketing, capital improvements, and
various development projects. BIDs are funded through special assessments collected from
the property owners in the defined boundaries of the district. For further details, see the
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To be sure, extending the common law of restitution to spiderless
networks is not the only possible solution to the externality problems we
have identified. As in other areas of business activity, there are tasks better
done by the state and others better done by market participants. Pursuing
one approach does not exclude the other. Take risk reduction as an
example: sometimes the polity prefers state regulation and sometimes the
preference is for market solutions, with the aid of tort law.148 In the network
context, the choice is between centralized state regulation and decentralized
market solutions aided by restitution law. While state involvement might
have advantages in some cases, it also has flaws. Political constraints and
prohibitive costs are possible reasons not to prefer state efforts to
internalize network externalities: the state would confront substantial
informational barriers in seeking to support and maintain spiderless
networks. It would be difficult for any central authority to identify
accurately those settings where networks might flourish. In many of these
cases, market mechanisms can prove to be more effective and productive
than state initiatives, and there seems little justification for precluding the
former just because the latter is also feasible. Indeed, the motivation for
this Essay is the evidence that many spiderless networks either fail or do
not function efficiently, and it is perhaps for good reason that state taxes
and subsidies are not found in the case of the examples we have identified.
This is not to say that efforts by the state to facilitate internalization
through restitution law would be undesirable. If the state chose to support
network welfare, it could authorize the creation of specialized, expert
tribunals to consider restitution claims. Expert tribunals could better
evaluate the losses suffered by some network participants and impose
liability accordingly on the network's "winners."149
2. Evaluation Difficulties
Another possible objection to recognizing the restitution claims of
network members is the daunting task courts might face in evaluating the
many externalities present in spiderless networks. Indeed, if costs and
benefits cannot be verified at reasonable cost, no restitution claim would
succeed. Therefore, the ability of courts to develop proxies for difficult to
verify facts is a pre-condition for adopting any right of restitution for
network members.
In predicting how daunting a task that might be, consider the
following points. First, when authorizing a restitutionary recovery, courts
would primarily be charged with measuring net losses and determining
website of The Los Angeles Downtown Center Business Improvement District,
http://www.downtownla.com (last visited July 24, 2016), and Downtown DC BID,
http://www.downtowndc.org (last visited July 24, 2016).
148 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 95-129 (1970) (discussing the pros and
cons of market deterrence (a market solution) and specific deterrence (a regulatory solution)
as a mean to reduce accident costs).
149 Supra Section II.C.5.
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whether the losers' participation in the network was efficient. Damage
measures need not be accurate: in tort law, for example, damages are often
determined through rough estimates rather than by an accurate calculation
of losses, especially when bodily injury is at stake.150
Second, to compensate the losers, courts would also be asked to
impose liability on winners and that requires estimates of benefits
internalized and externalized by them. Note, however, that the exact
magnitude of the benefits is not the important fact. Instead, the key is to
determine the relative share of all winners in the creation of the network
surplus. Relative shares are easier to measure than the exact magnitudes of
each firm's share. Again, rough estimates are sufficient here, just as they
are enough in tort cases when liability is apportioned among joint
tortfeasors or between injurers and their contributorily negligent victims.151
Third, as we suggested above, specialized tribunals can play an
important role in reducing the costs of verifying restitution claims.
Tribunals can be established by the state, by trade associations, or by
network participants themselves in order to avoid evaluation difficulties.
3. Enforceability
The prospect of ongoing litigation and enforcement costs is a final
objection to extending restitution law to spiderless networks. The creation
of network externalities is not a singular event: networks are dynamic
organisms and externalities are created continuously. Thus, if litigation
results whenever network losses and benefits are shared disproportionately,
the magnitude of enforcement costs over time would be unsustainable. One
response is that courts (or specialized tribunals) can limit the right to
pursue restitution claims so as to avoid repeat litigation by, for example,
precluding subsequent claims for a period of years. In addition, courts
could require plaintiffs to prove damages based on the defendant’s ex ante
liability (for expected gains and losses) rather than its ex post liability (for
realized losses and gains). While there are various considerations in
choosing between these two liability rules, enforceability convenience is a
prime consideration in this context. One of the advantages of an ex ante
liability rule is that it requires one determination of liability, at the outset,
when the network is created or survival is threatened, and no further
liability afterwards.
D. Restitution as a Bargain-Enabling Default
Given the substantial costs of verifying the benefits and costs
150

See, e.g., Welsh v. Martinez, 157 Conn. App. 223, 243 (2015) (ruling that "[p]roper
compensation... falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages"); Williams v.
Mathieu, 155 So. 3d 54, 59 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014) ("[P]ain and suffering are …
inherently speculative in nature and cannot be set with mathematical certainty").
151 See DOBBS et al., supra note 88, at 286 ("attribution of fault percentages is necessarily a
rough approximation even though it is expressed in mathematical terms").
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individual firms incur in spiderless networks, it is tempting to argue that
restitution claims of the sort we have outlined above rarely will succeed
and even less frequently will be pursued by firms that have suffered lost
value in network activity. Nevertheless, a restitution regime can have a
positive effect on improving network efficiency even in a world where
successful claims are rare: the acknowledgement by the state that a
restitution remedy is an available legal option can motivate firms
participating in spiderless networks to search for ex ante contractual
solutions that better address the network’s goal of achieving a reciprocity
equilibrium. In that sense, a restitution regime can serve as a bargainenabling default—a virtual spider in the web—that increases the
probabilities that parties will more easily resolve the collective action
problems that otherwise plague spiderless networks.
The available evidence suggests that networks with spiders offer a
broad menu of contractual solutions that mitigate the positive and negative
externalities that characterize informal network cooperation. For example,
food cooperatives form organically as spiderless networks, but those that
survive typically then organize around a bureaucratic structure that
internalizes much of the external effects of informal cooperative
behavior.152 Similarly, franchise networks, construction networks, and
modern supply chains are merely a few examples of ways a central entity
can organize network activity contractually by using master contracts,153
third party beneficiary law154 and related contractual means of
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See e.g., Nigel D. Poole et al., Formal Contracts in Fresh Produce Markets, 23 FOOD
POL'Y 131 (1998) ("The challenges facing the food industry in tackling uncertainty and
thereby reducing transaction costs are being met in part through an array of contractual
arrangements, such as partnerships and alliances that aim to achieve greater vertical
coordination and efficiency....Closer coordination can also be achieved through the use of
written contracts"); Rachel E. Goodhue et al., Contracts and Quality in the California
Winegrape Industry, 23 REV. INDUS. ORG. 267 (2003) ("Contracts …have been important in
broiler chicken production, and in fruit and vegetable production for many years, and are
becoming increasingly important in other commodities....); H. Christopher Peterson et al.,
Strategic Choice along the Vertical Coordination Continuum, 4 INT'L FOOD AND
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT REV. 149, 149-50 (2001) ("Many variations of vertical coordination
have evolved…in agri-food markets..including joint ventures, keiretsus, virtual
corporations, licensing agreements, production specification contracts, etc.").
153 See, e.g., Long Term Agreement between John Deere & Company and Stanadyne
Corporation (5 year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration systems, injection
nozzles and related products by Deere from Stanadyne); Agreement between Phoenix
Technologies Ltd. and Intel Corporation (December 1995) (supply contract for Phoenix to
be a principal supplier of system-level software to Intel); General Terms Agreement
between the Boeing Company and Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (June 30, 2006) (general terms
agreement covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular product to be supplied by
Spirit); Component Supply Agreement between American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. and
General Motors Corporation (June 5, 1998) (requirements contract for motor vehicle
components to be supplied by AAM to GMM).
154 See generally, Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, (manuscript at 34-35) (arguing that the
legal question regarding third party beneficiary law shouldn't be whether the contract parties
intended to confer a beneﬁt on the plaintiff. Instead, the correct question is whether it would
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internalization.
Spiderless networks lack a means of organizing the distribution of
network value precisely because high transaction costs impede the creation
of a spider or any other contractual arrangement among members. So how
might parties opt out of a restitution default when transaction costs are
high? After all, opting out requires a contractual arrangement and if
contracts are infeasible opting out is infeasible as well. Here the
coordinating function of the restitution regime offers a possible solution. A
bargain-enabling default, such as the restitution remedies we have
analyzed, economizes on transaction costs by providing focal points that
align the parties’ expectations and thus permit them to solve a coordination
problem more efficiently. Parties who participate in networks are involved
in a mixed motive game. They coordinate on certain expectations but have
conflicting interests on others. One way they align their expectations is
through communication. When the parties can communicate, experiments
show that their “cheap talk” facilitates coordination.155 As Thomas
Schelling famously noted, when the problem is selecting one means of
coordinating among many, focal point solutions stand out and attract the
attention of both parties.156 In short, the state’s comparative advantage is its
ability to create salience by publicizing the restitution default. Once
announced, the focal point default economizes on costly precontractual
communications: this function is especially valuable when the parties have
different possible ways to coordinate, and there is no consensus as to how
to do so.
The current default rule in spiderless networks is zero compensation to
network members who have suffered negative externalities from network
activity. Appropriately designed restitution remedies can create a more
attractive focal point and thereby improve network efficiency. All network
firms benefit from an agreement that reduces uncertainty and avoids
expected litigation costs. Indeed, even short of a fully specified master
contract, the parties can always contract ex ante over future damage claims
in order to make the implementation of an eventual recovery in restitution
less costly.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Essay we have proposed recruiting restitution law in order to
support the formation and operation of spiderless business networks. While
some spiderless networks function today without legal intervention, the

be ex ante proﬁtable for the network contracting members to serve the potential beneﬁciary
class to which the plaintiff belongs).
155 See, e.g., Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap
Talk, 78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 287 (1998) ("When players' preferences are sufficiently
close, communication via cheap talk can be informative").
156 THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-55 (1963).
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evidence suggests that many are fragile and fail to form successfully. Our
foundational claim is that well-designed restitution remedies will induce
more parties to participate cooperatively in forming durable networks, and
that those networks—both existing and new—will generate increasing
levels of trust and cooperation—the core welfare benefits of network value.
To be sure, the chilling effects endemic in a legal regime where expected
verification costs are substantial, as well as the ancillary risk of crowding
out, argues for a low-powered restitution remedy: in most cases, a court
extending restitution law to spiderless networks should limit any firm that
has suffered uncompensated costs from network activities to the difference
between its costs and benefits unless the firm can establish its central role
as a magnet enterprise.
The tremendous growth of spiderless business networks in recent
years has attracted little attention from legal scholars. This neglect is no
longer justifiable. Nevertheless, for several reasons our normative claims
are tentatively held. The salient legal issues concern the externalities that
some network dyads confer or impose on other network dyads and the
consequent issues of liability and remedy. But since lawyers have largely
ignored the subject, what courts are capable of doing in network contexts
are largely unexplored issues. There is thus little institutional wisdom to
exploit. Moreover, economists that study networks are not concerned with
the issues of liability and strategic defection that occupy lawyers. Hence,
the economic literature offers less wisdom here than it does in other
contexts. Finally, our normative criterion is partial: legal rules that increase
network member welfare will not always increase social welfare. It is an
open question just how wide the actual divergence is between local and
global efficiency.
Despite these caveats, we conclude with two claims. First, the issues
raised by possible restitution claims in connection with business networks
deserve a more prominent place in legal scholarship. To be sure, liability
for benefits conferred is much less common in the law than liability for
harms or for breach of contract, and for good reason.157 The new
Restatement on Restitution and Unjust Enrichment shows, however, that
restitution law can usefully improve efficient operation of business activity
in areas of commercial life that traditionally have been considered to be out
of its sphere. The demand for an increased scholarly focus on the nature
and extent of legal liability in network contexts is justified by the subject’s
practical significance, its normative importance and its intellectual interest.
Second, we believe that courts should interpret existing law in terms that
promote the formation and successful operation of business networks. This
normative criterion is more likely to survive a social welfare analysis than
is the disinterested posture of current law.
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Porat, supra note 75, at 198-200 (presenting the law's different approach to benefit and
harm cases, and suggesting justifications).

